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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 This dissertation investigates the impacts of transnational remittances and 
the institutionalization of diaspora engagement on development in Africa. 
Remittances to Africa are now around $50 billion annually and larger than inflows 
of foreign aid and investment. African governments continue to realize the potential 
contributions of their diasporas to development through not only remittances but 
through skills, expertise-sharing, and coordination of efforts. In 2000, four African 
countries had national-level institutions nominally dedicated to the diaspora and its 
potential to effect development: now 36 of the 54 governments have such an 
institution. An assessment of the political economy of remittances and 
governmental diaspora institutions reveals structural challenges to leveraging the 
contributions and skills of the diaspora for development. Through longitudinal 
instrumental variables regression analysis, data from between 1990 and 2010 from 
43 African countries are used to test the hypotheses that (1) as the ratio of 
remittances to gross national income increases to a critical value, African states will 
experience higher growth rates in human development, after reaching a critical 
value, African states will experience lower growth rates in human development; and 
(2) African states with a national-level formal institution of the diaspora will 
experience higher growth rates in human development than those without such an 
institution. The results show that smaller amounts of remittance are positively 
associated with development and that larger amounts are negatively so. 
Overreliance on remittances exposes a dearth of opportunities within a state’s 
iv 
borders and the costs to production and development of losing too many citizens to 
outmigration. Though the analysis finds no statistically significant difference 
between development in countries with and without national level diaspora 
institutions, research reveals a common set of challenges for these budding 
organizations: inadequate data, intergovernmental coordination, and resources. 
Diasporic Africans stand to impact development on the continent now more than 
ever. For development, African governments now must balance the challenges of 
leveraging the skills and expertise of growing diasporas on one hand, and on the 
other, managing migration by increasing institutional capacities so that citizens can 
thrive and want to stay.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
AN INTRODUCTION 
Processes of globalization over the last few decades – those of increasing 
international interdependence and transnational integration – have thus far 
arguably done little to equilibrate opportunities between the global North on one 
hand and Africa and the rest of the “developing” world on the other. These 
processes, however, have lowered transaction costs – including those of travel, 
technology, and communication – associated with leaving one’s country of origin in 
search of better opportunities elsewhere. By 2010, international migrants 
numbered over 213 million, more than the entire population of Brazil, the world’s 
fifth most populous state (Migration Policy Institute (MPI) 2012). Through formal 
channels alone, those migrants sent almost $300 billion back home (World Bank 
2011). Though neither the notion of migration nor the idea of emigrants sending 
money home is new or unique to our times, unprecedented numbers of 
transnational migrants and volumes of remittances at the start of the twenty-first 
century call attention to a growing cadre of transnational political, economic, and 
social actors. Particularly, growing numbers of diasporic actors have caught the eye 
of home governments. Large numbers of developing states have begun to, at least 
rhetorically, formally institutionalize engagement with their respective diasporas in 
the name of development. In Africa, since 2000, the number of states with ministries 
or other national-level offices of the diaspora has grown from four to over 30.  
An Introduction 
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My research considers these two, perhaps related, phenomena – growing 
transnational remittances and the formal institutionalization of diaspora 
engagement – as potential sources of “development from abroad” in Africa. 
Specifically, I address questions about different levels of remittance: is any amount 
of remittance beneficial for development? And, if so, how much may be too much, 
suggesting genuine losses in potential progress and productivity at home due to the 
depletion of human capital associated with migration? I also investigate the recent 
growth of national ministries and other offices nominally dedicated to the diaspora 
and consider their structures and functions, including why governments are 
compelled to create such institutions and whether and how they facilitate diasporic 
involvement in development processes at home. 
REMITTANCES, DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT, AND DEVELOPMENT 
Theoretical and empirical work on the development impacts of remittances 
has been, until recent decades, mostly couched in a larger body of literature on 
migration and development. Many, like De Haas (2010) and Gamlen (2010), 
characterize trends in this larger literature as alternating periods of optimism and 
pessimism depending upon concurrent prevailing paradigms in development theory 
or circumstances in the international political economy. Both interpretations are 
viable. For instance, functionalist and modernization (optimist) theories of 
development in general in the 1950s and 1960s looked optimistically toward 
migration and its impacts on development. On the other hand, after the oil crises of 
the 1970s, retracting economies and surplus labor – hence decreased demand for 
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labor (migration) – caused the industrialized nations to turn a pessimistic eye 
toward migration-engendered development in the global South. Accordingly, in each 
era if migration is viewed as “good” or “bad” for development, remittances are as 
well.  
THEORETICAL APPROACHES 
In the decades immediately following WWII, economic development was the 
goal of many strategies and topped the agendas of the new International Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or World Bank) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). Neoclassical or orthodox economic approaches to 
development prevailed and theorized that migration for the sake of development – 
transfers of value, balanced growth – was an appropriate option for many in 
developing countries and regions (Harris and Todaro 1970; Ranis and Fei 1961). 
Economists created formal models applicable to international migration as well as 
rural-urban migration. Implicit in these models was the eventual and permanent 
return of migrant workers, bringing with them capital as well as experience and 
education, all of which they could apply at home for development. On the 
microeconomic level, individuals in poor areas would rationalize decisions to 
migrate based on expectations of increased income (Massey et al. 1993: 433-5).  
Historical-structuralists (see Frank 1966) and dependency theorists (see 
Cardoso and Faletto 1979) responded to neoclassical theories of migration and 
development with the argument that the institutionalization of capitalism in the 
international political economy had left many states in the global South in perpetual 
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underdevelopment and subordinate to the industrialized North. Seemingly 
unending demands for labor in developed states discouraged searches for alternate 
employment at home and disincentivized innovation in the local and national 
economies of the developing world (Cobbe 1982). Reichert (1981) called this the 
“migrant syndrome”, in which there stood no end in sight to the depletion of labor 
supplies and the attenuation of real development opportunities for citizens of 
underdeveloped states. Preoccupation with “brain-drain” of highly-skilled/educated 
citizens would surpass but not eclipse worries over losses in labor in the coming 
decades, and remittances could not possibly compensate for the losses in 
productivity and increases to prosperity that would have come without emigration 
(Bhagwati and Rodriguez 1975; Carrington 1999).  
In the 1980s and 1990s, newer approaches surfaced, namely the New 
Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) and interdisciplinary transnational 
approaches. The NELM shifts the unit of analysis from the individual to the 
household and conceptualizes migration and migration decisionmaking as 
diversification of risk strategies for households in rural areas or poor countries. 
Further, remittances can be a safety net and incoming capital to invest in additional 
or more efficient production (Massey et al. 1993; Taylor 1999). Transnational 
approaches view migration as a process involving individuals, households, extended 
families, and communities at home as well as in intermediary and destination 
locales. While they concentrate on the movements of people, goods, and ideas across 
borders, proponents of transnational perspectives also focus on the people and 
places, and socioeconomic and political institutions found within transnational 
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networks (Basch et al. 2008; Glick Schiller 2009). Migration and remittances can 
help or hurt development processes at home, but also have economic, psychological, 
and sociocultural impacts on destinations and people. Transnational perspectives, 
and to a lesser extent those of NELM, try to reconcile agency, structure, and context 
in migration-development debates, which should be the goal of empirical work on 
the development impacts of migration and remittances. 
RECENT EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF REMITTANCE  
Empirical research on transnational remittances has grown considerably 
over the last two decades, due most likely to the increasing quantities of cash 
crossing borders. Many studies are at the household level, fewer consider the 
relationship between remittances and development on the national level, and all of 
these (save a few) operationalize development narrowly as economic. Many studies 
fail to address endogeneity questions of remittance: were those (households, 
nations) that receive remittances already better off before migration? Finally, 
quantitative studies tend to use invalid measurements for remittances, grouping 
together traditional workers’ remittances with migrants’ transfers and employees’ 
compensation (explained below). Failing to attend to these concerns calls many 
results into question. 
Specific studies have shown that rural households receiving remittances are 
more likely to escape poverty than those who do not receive them (Sander and 
Maimbo 2008). Others have supported the idea that spillover effects can increase 
opportunities beyond remittance-receiving households by increasing demand and 
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creating jobs (Bardouille 2008; Chimhowu et al. 2005). Rarer studies 
conceptualizing development in social terms have found that remittance-receiving 
households had higher birth weights and that children averaged more schooling 
than in non-recipient households (International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
2006; Ratha 2009). Macroeconomic research, on the other hand, tends to show 
negative relationships between remittances and development. Many empirical 
studies assert that rising levels of remittances may stymie overall economic growth 
(Barajas et al 2009; Chami et al. 2008; Singh, Haacker, and Lee 2009).    
THE GROWTH OF GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS OF THE DIASPORA 
Remittances are not the only offering expatriates bring to the development 
table. Growing numbers of developing countries are attempting to positively engage 
their diasporas for development through the skills and networks diasporans have 
acquired and built. Strategies for diaspora engagement are numerous. As stated 
above, the institutionalization of diaspora engagement on the part of governments is 
gaining popularity, especially in Africa. Just over five percent of African countries 
had a national-level ministry or other agency a decade ago, and now over 60 percent 
of African states have some type of diaspora engagement organization. Studies of 
diaspora-engaging government institutions are scant, which is understandable since 
most of them are very new.  
The groundbreaking “Institutionalizing Diaspora Engagement within 
Migrant-Origin Governments” by Aguinas (2009) researched 45 such institutions in 
30 developing countries and overall found ambitions unmatched by capacities. 
Development from Abroad? 
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Structurally, many institutions are found at the subministry level as a vice ministry 
or directorate of the diaspora, though a number of developing countries have full 
ministries of the diaspora. Other institutional arrangements are varied and include 
the Office of the Diaspora within the Office of the President as in Sierra Leone and 
the National Council on Mexicans Abroad (1-15).  
Aguinas (2009) cites some of the same challenges to the effectiveness of 
these institutions in general that other smaller-scale studies have found. Changes of 
government, lack of coordination, and lack of reliable data on emigrants, diaspora 
locales, and remittance volumes are common obstacles (African Diaspora Policy 
Centre (ADPC) 2011; Plaza 2009). Some administrations virtually ignore diaspora 
affairs offices established by previous presidents as in Nigeria in the 2000s. Many 
governmental bureaucracies have multiple ministries, agencies, and offices at least 
tangentially connected to expatriates and the diaspora and newly created 
bureaucratic units only conflate already disorganized efforts. More empirical 
research is needed on these nascent organizations and their effectiveness. 
DEVELOPMENT FROM ABROAD FOR AFRICA? 
Is it possible to cultivate “development from abroad” for Africa? Results from 
previous studies discussed above are conflicting and consensus has yet to be 
reached on this question. My research contributes to narrowing several lacunae in 
the knowledge about the relationships between both transnational remittances and 
the institutionalization of diaspora engagement with development processes at 
home. I supplement the existing body of research in at least three ways: through my 
An Introduction 
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geographic focus and scope, holistic conceptualization of development, and 
methodological approach. In this section I address each of these aspects in turn. 
REMITTANCES TO AFRICA VIS-À-VIS OTHER DEVELOPING REGIONS 
As noted above, most of the research on the development impacts of 
transnational remittances and diaspora engagement focuses on the developing 
regions other than Africa. It is important to study the impacts of remittances and 
diaspora engagement in the developing world as a whole, yet just as important to 
study their differing impacts across developing regions more equitably. 
Remittances, in particular, as a form of transnational capital constitute different 
portions of all transnational flows and therefore vary in significance dependent 
upon region.  
First, to understand their significance in the developing world, it is useful to 
compare remittances to other transnational capital flows, namely official 
development assistance (ODA, or aid, hereafter) and foreign direct investment 
(FDI). Global remittances now far exceed global flows of aid. Figure 1.1 considers 
the three flows of transnational capital to the developing world. To these countries, 
FDI surpassed ODA flows in the early 1990s, and remittance did the same later in 
the decade. In 2010, while FDI accounted for 52 percent of inward-bound capital to 
the developing world, remittances made up 36 percent. Annual formal remittance 
flows – at $250 billion – were almost three times those of aid and comprised over 
two-thirds of the value of FDI. Furthermore, Figure 1.1 shows that the global 
recession of 2008 saw a 36 percent drop in FDI to developing countries from 2008 
Development from Abroad? 
9 
Chapter 1 
to 2009, while remittances only decreased by 5.5 percent, suggesting that 
remittances are more reliable and robust to exogenous or global economic shocks 
than are flows of directly business-related investments. 
FIGURE 1.1 TRANSNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS TO THE DEVELOPING WORLD1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To understand the idiosyncrasies of remittances across developing regions, 
Figure 1.2 compares flows of transnational capital among these regions and 
highlights the differences in its composition. Africa is distinctive in two ways. First, 
it is the last of these developing regions to garner more remittances than aid, with 
the former surpassing the latter in 2007. To Asia/Pacific, Eastern Europe/Central 
Asia, and Latin America/Caribbean respectively, remittances surpassed aid flows in 
1999, 2005, and 1994.  Second, of the four developing regions represented, in Africa 
the three flows are the most equal, that is to say remittances, aid, and FDI make up 
roughly a third of total flows. In 2010, remittances were actually the largest of the 
three at 36 percent, followed closely by FDI at 35 percent. 
An Introduction 
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FIGURE 1.2 TRANSNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS BY DEVELOPING REGION2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On par with the two other major forms of transnational inflows, remittances 
to Africa may well prove to be more vital for development than other developing 
regions. More research needs to focus on the role of remittances in development 
processes in Africa. My research addresses this need by focusing on Africa and 
including all countries for which data are available: 43 or four-fifths of countries on 
the continent.   
A HOLISTIC CONCEPTUALIZATION OF DEVELOPMENT 
As pointed out above, studies of the remittance impacts on development 
usually choose to operationalize development as wholly economic, while markedly 
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fewer studies consider social aspects of development, namely education and health 
as development. Only a handful of studies consider more than one of these three 
aspects, and then do so separately. Development herein is characterized not only by 
increases in incomes or economic productivity, but also by increasing access to 
social institutions, such as those of education and health. The conceptualization of 
development I use throughout highlights growing discursive trends that recognize 
the necessity but not sufficiency of an economic component in the development of 
states (Anand and Ravallion 1993; Sen 1999; Stiglitz 2002). Increases in gross 
domestic product (GDP), for example, do not predictably translate to increased 
political power, more education, or a higher degree of social inclusion for many or 
most of a nation’s people. Development herein is defined as an historical process of 
change working toward the betterment of a nation’s people through not only 
increases in income, but through increased access to social services and institutions 
as well, such as those of education and health (Sen 1999; Lindley 2010).  
To complement the existing literature, my research posits as the outcome a 
modified version of the Human Development Index (HDI), developed by the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP). As discussed in detail in Chapter Four, for 
the quantitative analysis I calculate an index of gross national per capita production 
purchasing power parity (GNPppp), expected years of schooling for children, and 
life expectancy at birth. I do not attempt to take credit for the creation of such an 
index; I only point out that this strategy is superior to those in the existing body of 
literature that consider only one aspect of development or consider more than one 
separately. Around 80 percent of transnational remittances are spent on immediate 
An Introduction 
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needs: food, housing, school fees, and access to healthcare (Bardouille 2008: 13). 
Similarly, many programs involving diaspora-government coordination have as 
their objective to build or provide access to schools or healthcare facilities. 
Accordingly, as a minimum, studies of the impacts of transnational expatriate 
contributions to development at home should all therefore conceive of development 
as increases in education and healthcare access as well as increases in incomes. 
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
The methodological approaches I utilize to analyze the relationships between 
(1) transnational remittances and development, and (2) formal institutionalization 
of diaspora engagement and development augment the existing literature in at least 
four ways. These include: more accurate measurement of remittances, accounting 
for their potential endogeneity, using a deviation-from-fit measure for development, 
and quantitatively modeling the association between formal government diaspora 
institutions and development. 
First and following Basch et al. (2008), I understand those expatriates who 
maintain ties with their home countries as “transmigrants” and define this term as 
those who emigrate and “develop and maintain multiple relationships—familial, 
economic, social, organizational, religious, and political—that span borders” (263). 
This specification – rather than emigrant, immigrant, or migrant – conveys the more 
or less perpetual series of interactions among those who leave home and those who 
remain.3 The maintenance of economic networks and relationships across borders 
is most often performed through transnational remittances, defined as money sent 
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home to family and friends by transmigrants.  Though only these monies are what 
most would conventionally consider as remittances, almost every study of 
remittance groups these with two more quantities: “migrants’ transfers” and 
“employees’ compensation”.  
This specification is erroneous in most contexts. The three categories are 
outlined by the IMF as part of annual balance-of-payments information. Migrants’ 
transfers represent the value of assets and capital transferred to a country by its 
immigrants upon setting up residence, and therefore should not be counted as 
conventional remittances. One particularly exemplary case cited by the IMF itself is 
that of Bill Gates, a US citizen who in 2007 changed his residency – and thus 
transferred $56 billion in assets – to Barbados (Chami et al. 2008: 4). In this extreme 
case, classifying this migrant transfer as remittance would have greatly distorted the 
true amount of remittances to Barbados.   
“Employees’ compensation” in this context specifies salaries paid to non-
resident citizens by resident businesses and thus – like migrants’ transfers – do not 
constitute conventional remittances (Chami et al. 2008: 5). Salaries are incomes, not 
formal transfers between non-residents and residents, and should not be confused 
with remittances. Portions of these incomes formally transferred back home to 
family and friends will be recorded as workers’ remittances, the more conventional 
category, and accordingly then, should be included in analyses. Again, while most 
studies of the impacts of remittances combine all three amounts – workers’ 
remittances, migrants’ transfers, and employees’ compensation – as “remittances”, 
An Introduction 
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my analysis which only considers the conventional category, stands to test the true 
impacts of transnational remittances on development. 
Second, I control for the potential endogeneity of transnational remittances 
by using instrumental variables techniques; many previous studies have failed to do 
so. Transnational remittances may be endogenous to development, and specifically 
to measures of human development. In other words, citizens in countries with 
higher rates of education, life expectancy, and income are more likely to have and to 
take advantage of opportunities to emigrate than citizens of lesser developed 
countries. More educated and healthier expatriates are more likely to obtain higher-
paying employment as well. Instrumental variables techniques discussed more in 
Chapter Four are a plausible strategy for removing the endogenous portion of 
suspect variables through an additional stage of estimation.  
Third, through one more stage of estimation I calculate a deviation-from-fit 
measure as the dependent variable with the aim of comparing countries’ strides in 
development to their development peers. As fully explained in Chapter Four, the 
deviation-from-fit strategy starts with a growth equation for the modified HDI: 
regressing changes in the index on starting levels and saving the residual values for 
each country-year. These residuals measure excesses or shortcomings of countries 
relative to other countries at similar starting points at a given time. This not only 
allows for better comparisons and assessments, but also accounts for the reality that 
more developed countries have less ground to cover in reaching development 
aspirations than do less developed countries. Most analyses of remittance impacts 
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posit as their outcome either the level of development or the change in development 
and therefore do not account for initial levels or relative changes. My analysis more 
accurately isolates the effects of remittances – and additionally, the effects of formal 
governmental institutions of the diaspora. 
Fourth, employing a longitudinal multinational quantitative approach to the 
effects of these emergent diaspora institutions as my analysis does is unique. Due 
mostly to the relative recentness of such institutions, most studies involving them 
are descriptive. Extant research considers one institution or program, or searches 
for descriptive commonalities and differences in their structures and/or functions. 
By including the absence or presence of formal government institutions of the 
diaspora in a large-scale longitudinal quantitative analysis, combined with the 
operationalization of development discussed above, my research stands to measure 
associations between strides in development and the presence of these institutions, 
as compared to countries’ development peers without any such institution. 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS RESEARCH 
In addition to filling gaps in the existing literature on the impacts of 
remittances and the institutionalization of diaspora engagement, this research 
presents useful information for policymakers. National, regional, and local 
policymakers, IGOs, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and diasporic 
members and groups can find use for this research. Obtaining results that support 
(or refute) the hypotheses herein will contribute to a better understanding of the 
impacts of remittances and diaspora engagement for African development.  
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First, there exists a lack of data on the existence of formal institutions of the 
diaspora at the national-level across Africa. Since these institutions have grown in 
number from four to over 30 just over the last decade, many development actors 
can benefit from the dissemination of these data. Policymakers in destination 
countries who seek to include resident diaspora groups in development efforts back 
home, such as programs at US Agency for International Development (USAID) 
(Newland 2010), can coordinate efforts with these emergent institutions and 
increase ownership of development projects. Policymakers in the new diaspora 
institutions can learn from and share strategies with their counterparts in other 
African states. Other actors such as NGOs could also use this knowledge to connect 
and facilitate relations between diaspora ministries or offices and diaspora groups 
or issue-based groups. Finally, diaspora members and groups who are unaware of 
the existence of these new government institutions can use this knowledge to 
connect with their home governments with the aim of development. 
Second, through the statistical technique of using the quadratic form of the 
remittances-to-GNI ratio (explained in detail in Chapter Four) I can help 
development actors and other academics to move beyond dichotomous 
characterizations of remittance impacts. Through this approach, I expect to show 
that small ratios of remittances-to-GNI are positive for development efforts. I also 
expect to find that larger, inordinate amounts can be detrimental for development, 
signifying losses in human capital as a reaction to domestic socioeconomic and/or 
political conditions – or perhaps, to a lesser extent, external ones – which, in many 
circumstances, small and regular infusions of cash at the household level cannot 
Development from Abroad? 
17 
Chapter 1 
mitigate. Though some theorizing (de Haas 2010) has emphasized that remittance 
impacts are diverse and dependent on actual amounts, most empirical studies argue 
that remittances are either good or bad for development, as mentioned above. 
Empirical evidence like that which I expect to show can help practitioners – 
policymakers and development IGOs and NGOs – to recognize when too much 
remittance as a proportion of income can sour development initiatives and suggest 
ways to counteract this tendency.  
Third, by analyzing together the development impacts of transnational 
remittances and the institutionalization of diaspora engagement, I can create new 
opportunities for these new government institutions to cooperate with diasporas 
and influence the effects remittances have at home. In countries with larger-than-
average ratios of remittances-to-income, diasporas and diaspora ministries and 
offices can work together on financial literacy programs and/or individual savings 
and investment plans for even a small portion of remitted funds. Efforts such as 
these may help to begin to mitigate the losses in productivity and human capital that 
come from disproportionate rates of emigration. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
 Table 1.A presents the formal statements of the hypotheses I will test to 
investigate the impacts of transnational remittance and diaspora-engaging 
government institutions in Africa. The rationale driving the bifurcated hypothesis 
regarding remittances – that small amounts with respect to income will be 
positively associated with development growth while larger amounts will be 
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negatively so – stems from two phenomena: the diversification of risk represented 
by small amounts of remittance (say, five percent of GNI or below), and the 
tendency toward dependence on one or another type of transnational capital inflow 
when it garners a disproportionately large segment of income. First, and as 
discussed in detail in the next chapter, the New Economics of Labor Migration 
(NELM) perspective posits that for receiving households remittances can diversify 
risk, act as a safety net for income fluctuations, and stimulate otherwise impossible 
investments. Acknowledging the hazard of committing an ecological fallacy (King 
1997), I test this theory in the aggregate level and posit that small amounts of 
remittance with respect to national income can encourage development by 
augmenting domestic income and investing in human capital (namely education and 
healthcare).  
TABLE 1.A  RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Research Question Hypothesis 
  
(1). How do transnational 
remittances impact processes of 
development in Africa? 
 
(1a). As the ratio of remittances to gross national 
income increases to a critical value, African states 
from 1990 – 2010 will experience higher growth 
rates in human development. 
 
 
(1b). After reaching a critical value, as the ratio of 
remittances to gross national income increases, 
African states from 1990 – 2010 will experience 
lower growth rates in human development. 
 
  
(2). Do African states with formal 
institutions of the diaspora see 
greater strides in development than 
those with no such institutions? 
(2). African states with a national-level formal 
institution of the diaspora will experience higher 
growth rates in human development.  
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To the second point, however, disproportionately large amounts of 
remittance may have the opposite impact. In this respect, remittances and foreign 
aid have common characteristics. Much of the aid literature addresses the 
propensity for developing countries to become dependent on foreign aid for day-to-
day operations and survival (see for example, Goldsmith 2001; Grant and Nijman 
1998; Moyo 2009). Developing countries relying too heavily on remittances could 
find themselves dependent upon these flows as well, and changes or interruptions 
in remittance patterns (including foreign exchange fluctuations) could negatively 
impact growth and sustainability in human development, especially when paired 
with internal and external shocks to non-diversified domestic economies as is often 
the case in the developing world.  
Furthermore, the presence of steady and plentiful remittance flows can have 
direct and indirect political effects. Developing country governments may be 
tempted to shirk responsibilities for social programs and to relax fiscal discipline by 
consuming or borrowing beyond their means, eventually sidelining their long-term 
development goals (Akokpari 2006; Chami et al. 2008).  Moreover, when expatriate 
family members remit the means for meeting basic needs and subsequently 
engender more complacent citizenries, authoritarian regimes may endure longer 
than otherwise (Ahmed 2012). Having been more or less relieved of their Weberian 
patrimonial duties to provide social protections and services – by a few hundred 
dollars sent by each of a few hundred-thousand expats each month – dictatorial 
rulers and their small coalitions can enjoy and enlarge their piece of the pie at the 
expense of the country’s development.  To account for the possibly duplicitous 
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nature of remittance impacts as amounts grow, I hypothesize a curvilinear 
relationship and operationalize remittances in the quadratic form for the 
quantitative analysis.  
For Hypothesis 2 in Table 1.1, I posit a positive relationship between the 
presence of a national-level diaspora-engaging governmental institution and human 
development. Since these institutions in Africa (and elsewhere) are diverse in 
structure and most are relatively new – less than five or ten years old – finding a 
measurable difference in development growth between countries with such an 
institution and those without may be optimistic. However, I argue that governments 
who attempt to engage their diasporas for development by erecting a (or an at least 
rhetorically) dedicated ministry or agency stand to cultivate a more positive rapport 
– over, of course, varying amounts of time – with their diaspora than governments 
lacking a dedicated institution.   
RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research design I will utilize to test the hypotheses is mainly quantitative 
in its approach. I will employ a two-stage instrumental variables cross-sectional 
time-series regression technique. This covers 43 African countries over five five-
year periods, from 1990 through 2010. The first stage regression uses instrumental 
variables to control for the endogeneity of remittance flows by regressing the 
measured ratio of remittance-to-GNI level of each country-year on the exogenous 
regressor that captures global remittance trends, the median ratio for all other 
remittance-receiving countries in Africa for the given year. The second stage utilizes 
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the development deviation-from-fit measure as the dependent variable, which 
measures a country’s successes or shortcomings in development against its 
development peers. The predicted values for the ratios of remittances-to-GNI from 
the second stage and their quadratic forms are regressors in this stage, as well as 
the binary variable for the presence of a formal governmental diaspora institution 
and control variables. 
 The lion’s share of the data comes from international governmental 
organizations (IGOs): the World Bank, the UNDP, MPI, and the IMF. Variables from 
these sources include the dependent variables used to construct the development 
index; remittances, exports, aid, and income data; and HIV prevalence and migration 
data. In addition, through various governmental and other sources I have compiled 
data for national-level governmental institutions of the diaspora.  
To augment the findings from the quantitative analysis, I also collect primary 
data from informal interviews in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, primarily with members of 
the diaspora who were visiting and/or investing in the city by building hotels and 
other businesses. After several attempts to schedule interviews with civil servants 
at the Directorate General of Diaspora Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
Addis Ababa, I was only able to briefly speak with a few workers about their 
diaspora programs and obtain standard information given to diasporic members 
who make inquiries to the Directorate. While traveling to multiple countries’ 
diaspora ministries and offices and spending more time there would have been 
optimal, resource constraints and the scope of this project only permitted a brief 
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stay in one destination. The data I was able to procure gave me additional context 
and a better understanding of government-diaspora relations in Ethiopia.   
LOOKING AHEAD 
In the face of increasing international migration which is likely to continue, 
rising levels of transnational remittances on par with other primary financial flows 
stand to greatly impact development in Africa in the twenty-first century. 
Concurrently, growing numbers of diaspora ministries and other national-level 
offices gain potential to become key development actors. Systematic analyses of the 
impacts of transnational remittances and the institutionalization of diaspora 
engagement in Africa are needed to fill gaps in an existing literature that favors 
other regions and tends to use flawed operationalizations of what constitutes a 
remittance. My research and analysis helps to fill these voids and has implications 
for policymakers, senders and receivers of remittances, and diaspora groups.  
The next chapter provides a survey of the existing relevant literature on 
migration and development, transnational remittances and their impacts, and the 
process of diaspora engagement. Chapter Three focuses on the key independent 
variables in this study. I provide overviews of the growth and nature of 
transnational remittances and the institutionalization of diaspora engagement in 
Africa. Chapter Four begins by describing development in Africa in terms of 
incomes, education, and health. I then present the control variables, explain the 
methodological techniques that I employ, and end with the results of the analyses. 
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Chapter Five summarizes, discusses the implications of this study, and posits 
potential avenues of further research.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An Introduction 
24 Combs 
NOTES: CHAPTER ONE
 
1 Graphs include developing countries from each region as specified by The World Bank as non-high-
income countries (World Bank 2011). For Africa, each of the 53 countries was classified as 
developing for the period of 1990 – 2010, save Equatorial Guinea. Equatorial Guinea is included in 
the calculations for the graph to provide the most complete coverage as possible for Africa. 
Furthermore, while ODA data is reported for every year shown for Equatorial Guinea, remittance 
data are unavailable, and FDI data are available only from 1990 – 1996. 
2 Same as above.  
3 Though I employ transmigrant in references to remitters in the context of my own research, to 
avoid anachronisms and with the aim of accurate representation I use the alternatives migrant, 
immigrant, and emigrant purposefully in describing the work of others and when appropriate in 
context 
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CHAPTER TWO 
MIGRATION, REMITTANCES, AND DEVELOPMENT 
The impacts of remittances and migration on development have been 
debated by policymakers and scholars since the 1950s. More recently, these debates 
have included a focus on the role of diasporic communities on the social, economic, 
and political development of home countries. The institutionalization of previously 
informal engagement between diasporas and home governments for development 
has led to the establishment of national level ministries and other offices, especially 
in Africa. This has highlighted the importance of earlier theoretical debates of 
whether remittances (and migration) were “helpful” or “harmful” for development 
in home countries.1 This chapter is divided into four sections. The first considers the 
discourse on migration and development, highlighting the role of remittances as 
well as the ebbs and flows of optimism and pessimism that have generally 
characterized the literature over the last few decades. I then narrow the focus and 
survey the more recent theoretical and empirical discourse on transnational 
remittances and development before exploring the newly emerging literature on 
processes of diaspora engagement and their institutionalization. The fourth section 
is a summary of the emergence of more complex approaches to migration, 
remittances, and development in an increasingly globalized economy, characterized 
by increased transnational linkages between diasporas and home governments.  
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MIGRATION: “GOOD” OR “BAD” FOR DEVELOPMENT? 
The larger body of theoretical and empirical work has historically alternated 
between a dominantly optimistic view of the relationship between migration and 
development and a pessimistic one (de Haas 2010). Unsurprisingly, if from a certain 
perspective migration is seen as positive for development, remittances are as well, 
and diasporas, expatriates, guest-workers, or temporary migrants (however 
characterized) then become “agents of development” of one type or another for 
home countries. Pessimistic views of the migration-development connection 
highlight the overall losses from migration borne by sending regions – for instance 
brain-drain and brawn-drain and exploitation of immigrant workers – that cannot 
be mitigated with infusions of capital in the form of remittances and generally 
deemphasize networks that connect diasporans to their home countries.  
NEOCLASSICAL APPROACHES 
In the decades immediately following World War II when international 
economic “development” topped the foreign policy agendas of many states and was 
a primary mandate for the emergent Bretton-Woods regime, views of the 
relationship between migration and development were mostly optimistic. The 
prevailing theories and analyses during the 1950s and 1960s – orthodox or 
neoclassical economics approaches – for the most part posited a formulaic template 
explicitly or implicitly based on the Heckscher-Ohlin model of international markets 
and trade. The model (Ohlin 1933) focuses on the factors of production – land, labor, 
and capital – and posits that equilibrium can be realized in the international 
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economy through the movement and relocation of labor and capital. Labor-rich and 
capital-scarce economies should export labor while capital-rich and labor-scarce 
economies should export (or invest) capital elsewhere. Balanced growth in the 
international economy is achieved through these movements.  
Applying these tenets in a (mostly) domestic context, early neoclassical 
economists (Harris and Todaro 1970; Ranis and Fei 1961; Sjaastad 1962; Todaro 
1969) created equilibrium models to address underdevelopment and 
unemployment problems in rural areas through labor migration to urban, 
industrialized areas. Inherent in these arguments was the return of migrants, 
bringing with them not only capital but the experiential and educational fruits of 
their labors, all of which they could then utilize in economic development processes 
at home. In this circular view of migration, the theoretical result is more balanced 
growth between urban and rural sectors domestically and industrialized and 
developing countries internationally. This balance will materialize through a 
convergence in global wages, wherein migration out of labor-rich, capital-poor 
countries drives up wages while decreasing wages in destination (labor-poor, 
capital-rich) countries. Moreover, at the microeconomic level, neoclassical 
economists theorized and modeled decisions to migrate through cost benefit 
analyses acutely focused on the expected returns of labor at home versus those in 
alternative destinations, which tended to favor perceptions of the increased benefits 
of migration (Massey et al. 1993: 433-5).  
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RESPONSES TO NEOCLASSICAL APPROACHES 
HISTORICAL-STRUCTURALIST APPROACHES 
By the late 1960s and beyond, it was becoming clear that global inequality 
was rising, not declining. Rooted in critical Marxist traditions of class-based 
explanations of domination and subordination, historical-structuralist approaches 
began to gain momentum in theoretical debates and empirical discourse. 
Significantly, A.G. Frank’s “The Development of Underdevelopment” (1966) and 
Cardoso and Faletto’s work on dependency theory (1979) criticized neoclassical 
development theory in general, beyond the issue of migration. In Frank’s 
assessment, perpetual circumstances of underdevelopment had been established in 
the global South alongside the institutionalization of capitalism in the international 
political economy, a process and system controlled by the industrialized and 
industrializing global North. For Frank, “underdevelopment” or economic 
“backwardness” was not a state of nature but an inherent result of capitalist 
endeavor through which metropoles exploited and expropriated resources from 
Southern satellites. Similarly, states in the global South or “periphery” became 
subservient and dependent upon northern, capitalist states in the “core” for Cardoso 
and Faletto and other proponents of dependency theory. This body of literature, 
chiefly the work of economists in or from Latin America, Asia, and sub-Saharan 
Africa, signified a turn toward pessimistic views of migration-engendered 
development. 
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Concurrent and later empirical analyses focused more acutely on migration 
and its impacts on development in source countries reflected this pessimism and 
refuted the orthodox theories. In a case study of Basotho migrant workers in South 
Africa, Cobbe (1982) draws two conclusions supporting dependency theory 
assertions at the regional level. First, the historic trend of seemingly perpetual labor 
demand in South Africa for Lesotho’s males continually minimized the necessity to 
search for or create alternative means of employment at home in Lesotho (849). 
Second, the exposure of inordinate numbers of Basotho workers to the standards-
of-living in South Africa –five times those of Lesotho – diminished demand for goods 
produced at home and altered consumption patterns that came to favor imported 
products (850). Cobbe claims that, coupled with the historical lack of demand for 
domestic employment, the decline in demand for domestically produced goods 
stymied Lesotho’s development for decades at least. This conclusion also supports 
what Reichert (1981) termed the “migrant syndrome,” asserting that migration robs 
sending regions of their labor and capital, and attenuates and disincentivizes local 
production of any sort (Massey et al. 1993; Taylor 1999).  Though not always 
explicitly, these arguments suggest that migrant workers and their families would 
spend the lion’s share of capital sent or brought home – remittances – on imported 
goods and therefore have negligible or negative development impacts. 
To briefly cite two more examples, a 1966 study by the Organization of 
Economic Development (OECD) “stressed that the acquisition of training and 
experience by migrants in Europe is both difficult and rare…it is virtually impossible 
to synchronize the demand for skills in regions of origin to the kinds of training 
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received by immigrants in host countries” (Penninx 1982: 783).  In his own review 
of empirical studies of Turkish migration in the 1960s and 1970s, Penninx found 
three common themes: that most migrants were not unemployed at the point of 
migration; that workers from rural or domestic underdeveloped regions were less 
likely to migrate; and that migrants’ education levels were higher than average in 
Turkey (1982: 793). All these findings refuted the neoclassical views that returning 
migrants would bring home a wealth of appropriate training or engender balanced 
growth and development. 
An important distinction to make is that while neoclassical approaches posit 
a unidirectional argument, migration as a “cause” for development, historical-
structuralists view a two-way street: underdevelopment as the “cause” of migration, 
a self-reinforcing mechanism that also perpetuates underdevelopment (Faist 2009). 
Neoclassicists saw what migrants brought back: experience, education, and capital. 
Historical-structuralists shifted focus to what the migrants took: labor and 
education and remittances could not solve the underdevelopment conundrum 
reinforced by the migration of labor and the educated masses, brawn-drain and 
brain-drain respectively. These phenomena further entrench sending regions into 
patterns of underdevelopment while increasing productivity in destination regions. 
While neoclassicists argued that returning migrants would invest their capital in 
increased productivity at home, critics emphasized that remittances are mainly 
spent on consumption and rarely invested, therefore not contributing to 
development. Furthermore and notwithstanding their uses, remittances cannot 
compensate for the losses in productivity and prosperity due to increasing 
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migration for historical-structuralists (De Hass 2006: 566; Goss and Lindquist 
1995). 
In particular, the issue of brain-drain from poor countries continues to 
receive much attention in the migration discourse. The primary implication of brain-
drain is that investments in education cannot support growth or any development 
returns for developing countries if many of its highly educated citizens leave 
(Carrington 1999). The ones left behind are likely to be worse off by these 
departures than before (Bhagwati and Rodriguez 1975). By 1998, an estimated one-
third of the populations with tertiary education from Africa, the Caribbean, and 
Central America had emigrated to OECD countries (Ratha 2005: 38). Surveying 1000 
expatriate Zimbabweans in the UK and South Africa, Bloch (2005) found that 82 
percent were university graduates and 38 percent of all those sampled in the UK 
were active in healthcare or social work (6-7).  
Beine et al. (2008) examine the effect of brain-drain in 120 developing 
countries and find a positive or “brain gain” effect overall. The authors then pursue a 
closer examination through a different quantitative approach that employs 
counterfactuals to measure the country-specific impacts based on the level of 
human capital formation at home along with the skill levels of migrants. In the case 
of some developing countries – those possessing relatively low levels of human 
capital coupled with low-skilled emigration patterns – a small positive effect (in 
terms of human capital gains at home) is visible. However, slightly more countries in 
the sample lose more high-skilled citizens to emigration, and in these cases the 
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effect is negative, supporting the authors’ brain-drain hypothesis when examining 
countries separately. Many small sub-Saharan African and Central American 
countries are particularly vulnerable in this respect. Predictably, China, Brazil, and 
India – most likely the three largest economies in the sample of developing 
countries – are among those gaining human capital from emigration. These three 
cases, the authors point out, tip the scales when examining the countries all at once 
and inform the conclusion that the developing world experiences a net small but 
positive gain from emigration.     
Other authors have argued for brain gain in that increased demand abroad 
for skilled workers stimulates domestic demand for education in developing 
countries toward the goal of emigration. Due to policy environments and situational 
circumstances that limit or prevent eventual emigration, not all those who seek and 
receive education will emigrate, thus raising human capital via education rates at 
home (Docquier and Marfouk 2006; Katz and Rapoport 2005; Stark et al. 1998).  At 
least two assumptions are inherent in these arguments: first that brain gain is more 
likely under strict policy barriers around emigration, and second that educational 
institutions are equipped to handle the increased demand (Gibson and Mckensie 
2011: 119). To the first point, these types of policies are themselves likely to work 
against development efforts and may be symptomatic of larger restrictive policy 
environments. To the second point, developing countries, especially the poorest of 
them, tend to lack the infrastructure to meet current demands on education.  All of 
these studies and the observations gleaned from them point to the importance of 
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incorporating context into discussions of brain-drain or gain and all the effects of 
migration more broadly.  
NEW ECONOMICS OF LABOR MIGRATION 
Though issues like brain-drain, brought to light by historical-structuralists, 
persist in theory and practice through today, by the 1980s economists were 
salvaging what they could from the earlier orthodox approaches and pushing 
forward with a new optimism. In 1985, Stark and Bloom synthesized much of the 
recent economic thinking toward migration and development under the label of the 
“New Economics of Labor Migration” (NELM). Unlike the dependency and other 
historical-structuralist arguments, NELM was and remains less a critique and more 
a sophistication of the neoclassical approach. At least one author, Abreu (2010), has 
recently all but labeled NELM a neoclassical wolf in sheep’s clothing.  Other authors 
such as Massey et al. (1993) drop the “labor” from the moniker and call the bundle 
of approaches the “New Economics of Migration,” most likely to highlight its 
differences from the more narrowly labor-focused neoclassical variant and to 
emphasize its relative breadth of considerations. Notwithstanding these 
disagreements, the introduction of NELM and its increased popularity through the 
1990s marked a return to optimism for many in the migration and development 
discourse.  
The fundamental difference between the NELM approach and its neoclassical 
antecedent is the unit of analysis. Neoclassical migration theories focused on the 
individual and individual decisionmaking processes, and the NELM posits that the 
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decision to migrate or not consciously involves a small group: the family, household, 
or farm, or any small group in more or less close quarters composed of would-be 
migrant(s) and non-migrants as the situation dictates.2 For Stark and Bloom, 
changing the unit of analysis from the individual to the household “shifts the [very] 
focus of migration theory” from an assertion of individual independence to one of 
mutual interdependence within the household (1985: 174).  
While one could argue that the expected return of migrants under 
neoclassical prescriptions also constitutes mutual interdependence, involving entire 
households in migration decisionmaking processes does so explicitly and removes 
the often false sense of liminality or impermanence from decisions to migrate. The 
notion of mutual independence is an important one, especially in terms of the 
nature of remittances for the NELM approach. In this view, decisions to migrate and 
potential remittances, unlike those professed by orthodox theories, go beyond 
increasing incomes to loosen constraints on production and investment borne from 
the relative absence of public and/or private insurance or safety nets in developing 
regions compared to developed ones.  Remittances not only increase incomes but 
also: diversify risks if for instance crops fail at home or act as unemployment 
insurance in case non-migrant household members lose jobs; and can provide 
capital to start new projects in the absence of reliable and affordable credit markets 
(Massey et al. 1993: 436-438; Taylor 1999: 64).  
These observations point to a similarity between NELM and seemingly 
opposing historical-structuralist arguments: the circularity of the migration-
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development relationship that neoclassical approaches missed. Historical-
structuralists see underdevelopment as the impetus for migration and then 
migration itself affecting development at home. Proponents of NELM posit that the 
constraints to prosperity found in poorer areas help to make migration an option in 
the decisionmaking process, which also considers the expected impacts on well-
being and development from the act of migration. One of the most important 
differences between the two approaches lies, of course, in the quality of the 
resultant impacts on development. Historical-structuralists and dependency 
theorists claim that non-migrants will be worse off due to local and societal losses in 
labor and skill, a discrepancy for which remittances cannot compensate. According 
to NELM, the household diversification of risk along with remittances will increase 
well-being and help to move along processes of development at home.       
TRANSNATIONAL APPROACHES 
Like the two previous schools-of-thought, transnational approaches also see 
migration and decisions whether to do so as a perpetual process. More exactly, 
transnational perspectives focus on the constant movements of people – along with 
goods and services and ideas – across borders and the networks they build, 
maintain, and expand. Many refer to these networks created through the 
relationships transmigrants maintain as “transnational communities.” Glick Schiller 
(2003) calls these networks “transnational social fields” and characterizes them as 
multi-dimensional and multi-sited. Transnational social fields are found in the 
interstices of states of origin and destination. They are a network of networks, 
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encompassing public and private organizations such as churches, schools, interest 
groups, government agencies and banking systems that connect those who leave 
with those who stay behind. Proponents of transnational approaches to migration 
and development claim that conceptualizing social relations in this way permits 
scholars to transcend earlier, more static connotations of societies bounded by the 
nation-state, all the while not forgetting the diversity and important roles of public 
policies that constrain transnational action (Basch et al. 2008; Glick Schiller 2009).  
Focused on the “betwixt and between” transnational approaches profess 
neither the eminent return of migrant workers à la neoclassicists, nor the inexistent 
or extremely low probability of emigrants’ return found in the dependency and 
NELM theories. Rather, the perspective of transnationalism emphasizes the more or 
less frequent transactions and communications occurring between those who leave 
and those who stay behind, as well as temporary returns and visits (Faist 2009: 43). 
It also stresses the role of transnational organizations, especially hometown 
associations (HTAs), in maintaining relationships for transmigrants across locales. 
These associations raise money for national and local projects, inform transmigrants 
of sociopolitical developments, and reinforce ties with community at home.  
Enduring institutions and ever-expanding linkages found in transnational 
communities or “social fields” also help explain the persistence of remittances from 
transmigrants who may never return home. Hometown associations and 
transmigrant communities at-large exert social pressures to remit. In her research 
on Somalis in London, Lindley’s respondents reported expected repercussions for 
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not remitting, not only from home, but from other Somali-Londoners with whom 
they live, work, or spend time (2010: 128-132). Though proponents of transnational 
perspectives are neither necessarily pessimistic nor optimistic toward the 
relationship between migration, remittances, and development, they tend to lean 
toward optimism. Many have argued, as in the Somali-London case, that remittances 
are a lifeline to otherwise dire straits, or that technological advances continue to 
make migration easier – economically and psychologically – and more beneficial for 
both transmigrants and non-migrants (De Haas 2010: 247). Most agree that the 
impacts of social and economic remittances depend upon the social, economic, and 
political environments in which they are given and received.  
Recently, some transnationalists have envisaged remittances as an extension 
of the ubiquitous neoliberal strategies that are continuously transferring 
responsibilities from governments to citizens and private enterprise (Glick Schiller 
2009; Phillips 2009). Neoliberal strategies invite citizens from developing regions 
into the global economy as migrant labor through state-based incentives to migrate 
such as training programs or the growing trend to legalize dual citizenship. 
Remittances from workers then relieve pressure on governments to provide for 
their citizens while the same neoliberal agendas of states and regions increasingly 
privatize social services such as healthcare and education (Phillips 2009: 240-245). 
For Glick Schiller, “remittance flows within a neo-liberal context highlight locational 
disparities that are no longer addressed by state policies that would aim to even out 
regional disparities” and therefore remittances can exacerbate (at least) geographic 
inequalities in many contexts (24). In this view, the same ideology promoted by 
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global power structures surfaces in different forms in different locales for 
transmigrants – and receives diverse responses including remittances, activism, 
movement, and adaptation. 
EVALUATING APPROACHES TO MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT THEORY 
It is this attention to context that underlines most contemporary 
assessments of the utility of various strands of migration and development theory. 
Hein de Haas (2010) concludes that the oscillation of prevailing optimism and 
pessimism regarding migration and its effects on development since the 1950s is 
primarily a reflection of paradigm shifts in more general social and development 
theory: from functionalists and modernization theorists (optimists) to structuralists, 
neo-Marxists, and dependency theorists (pessimists). The more recent NELM and 
transnational approaches may have at first signified a shift back to optimism but are 
really attempts to bring together agency (from neoclassical arguments) and 
structure (from dependency theories).  
Alan Gamlen (2010) offers a parallel explanation that whether current 
theorizing surrounding the relationship between migration and development is 
dominated by optimism or pessimism is a direct result of the environment of the 
international political economy. In times of migration “booms” – i.e., the era of 
economic expansion (in industrialized countries) in the 1960s and 1970s when 
demand for migrant labor remained high – the discourse leaned toward a positive 
view of migration and development as a way to achieve balanced growth. As a 
reaction to migration “bust” cycles like those after the oil crisis of the 1970s, the 
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discourse tended to favor an inverse relationship between migration and 
development (2010). The explanations from de Haas and Gamlen are synthesized by 
the assertions from Phillips and Glick Schiller above that theories of migration and 
development are only as useful as they are aware of contemporarily prevailing 
ideologies of global political economy and the ideas and forces of regional, local, and 
transnational political economies. These insights guide my review and assessment 
of current empirical research on remittances and development, to which I now turn. 
TRANSNATIONAL REMITTANCES AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT IMPACTS 
Most studies of remittance and development are performed at the household 
or community level through interviews and/or surveys. These address one 
community or many communities either nationally or cross-nationally. Other 
studies are case studies of the efforts to make remittances effective for development 
on the part of particular governments or hometown associations (HTAs).3 A smaller 
number of studies are cross-national and focus on the national level impacts of 
remittances. Most of these implicitly follow the assumptions of NELM and point to a 
rhetorical set of ‘sound’ macroeconomic policies and practices including the 
expansion of financial infrastructures and diaspora engagement efforts (on the part 
of governments) that are often elusive in developing nations, yet a necessary 
component in facilitating development through remittances (Bardouille et al. 2008; 
Maimbo and Ratha 2005). Still, all of these studies (save very few) operationalize 
development narrowly, as either economic (increases in household or national 
incomes), or social (access to education or healthcare). In this section I briefly 
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review previous studies of the development impacts of remittance in order to 
situate my objectives to help fill the gaps in the larger body of research. 
Studies of remittance focused on social development outcomes generally 
employ surveys or interviews and conclude that remittances have a positive impact. 
As part of a larger research agenda, analysts from the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) (2006) found that children from remittance-receiving households 
in Mexico averaged between 0.7 and 1.6 more years of schooling than those in 
households without the benefit of remittances. In Zimbabwe, households receiving 
remittances were also found to have higher education levels than those without 
remittances (Sander and Maimbo 2008: 63). Other studies have found that children 
in remittance-receiving households have lower dropout rates and that these 
households spend more on children’s tuition than non-receivers. Survey data from 
Sri Lanka showed that those households receiving remittance had higher birth 
weights than those not receiving remittances, which suggests that mothers in the 
former had better access to healthcare (Ratha 2009: 30). A recurrent problem with 
these studies and others like them is that most are cross-sectional, and those that 
are longitudinal are so for a relatively short time, such as a year or two. They fail to 
account for true longitudinal trends and preexisting circumstances and do not 
address questions of endogeneity and reverse causation such as “were remittance-
receiving households already better off – with more access to education and 
healthcare – before the point of emigration?” 
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Similar to studies concentrated on social development outcomes, research on 
remittances and economic development outcomes at the household and community 
levels tend to find a positive relationship. Sander and Maimbo (2008) administered 
surveys throughout Burkina Faso and found that transnational remittances have 
lowered rural households in poverty by seven percent and urban household rates by 
three percent. Many studies at the community level point to the spillover effects of 
more cash in local economies. This can increase local demand for goods and 
services, and can lead to more jobs for non-remittance-receiving members of a 
community (Bardouille 2008; Chimhowu et al 2005). In Egypt, remittances have 
spurred the creation of non-agricultural small businesses, the services of which are 
available to the greater community (IOM 2006: 53). In one rare study that 
operationalized development as both social (as children’s educational attainment) 
and as economic (as poverty reduction), Acosta et al. (2007) found that both 
conceptualizations are positively influenced by remittances. Through household 
surveys of communities nested across 11 Latin American countries, the authors 
found a modest lowering of poverty rates due to remittances along with increased 
educational attainment for children (conditional on parent education rates). Though 
studies using economic outcomes as development are more often longitudinal, they 
– like those with social outcomes above – narrowly conceptualize development as 
one-dimensional, and have a predominant geographic focus in Latin America or 
Southeast Asia, where remittances in the aggregate are greater than those to other 
developing regions, namely Africa. 
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Studies focused on the potential macroeconomic impacts of remittance – not 
development per se – highlight the benefits of increased foreign exchange for 
governments in developing nations. More foreign exchange can lower the relative 
cost of development-related and other vital imports. Of course the political will 
needs to be in place since, “whether or not the foreign exchange will actually be 
spent on imports essential for development is, of course, a key issue” (IOM 2006: 
54). Increased foreign exchange reserves can also buoy balance of payments 
accounts and service external debt, which in turn can increase access to 
international capital markets (Ratha 2009: 30). Securitization of future flows of 
remittance can also make international capital more accessible. Several South 
American nations including El Salvador, Brazil, and Peru have used securitized 
future flows as collateral to raise capital internationally. Using securitized future 
flows in this way is also generally less expensive than borrowing on sovereign credit 
(IOM 2006: 55).  
Extant macroeconomic research more acutely focused on development as an 
outcome tends to show negative effects of increased remittances in developing 
countries. In an empirical study for the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Singh, 
Haacker, and Lee (2009) found a negative relationship between growth in 
remittances (as a ratio to GDP) and GDP growth in 36 sub-Saharan states from 2000 
– 2005. Chami et al. (2008) point out that at the national level, there is a potential 
for governments to become reliant on remittances. This may cause them to relax 
fiscal policy discipline and start consuming or borrowing beyond their means, 
especially in developing countries with low tax revenues and little room for error. 
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Remittances may also cause governments to lose sight of long-term economic 
development plans. Furthermore, continued remittance dependence might result in 
a failure of economies to diversify (Akokpari 2006).  
A few previous empirical studies have found that remittances have a positive 
effect on measures of development. An integral part of modeling the effects of 
remittances is controlling for their possible endogeneity or reverse causality with 
the dependent variable. This is generally done with instrumental variable 
techniques. In practice, acceptable candidates for instrumental variables must be 
highly correlated with the endogenous variable but not with the dependent variable, 
and only affect the dependent variable through the endogenous predictor 
(Wooldridge 2002). The examples here are representative of the instrumenting 
strategies in the remittance-development literature. Adams and Page (2005) 
instrumented remittances with distance to the remittance-sending area (the US, 
OECD Europe, or the Persian Gulf), secondary education rates and a measure of 
government stability (in the home country) for an unbalanced panel of 71 
developing countries from 1980 to 1997. They argued that the instruments are not 
directly correlated with their dependent variable, poverty. One could plausibly 
argue, though, that education rates and government stability are related to poverty 
in developing countries. Their results showed that remittances play a positive role 
in reducing poverty. Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2005) modeled remittances and 
income growth using internal lags of both the dependent and endogenous right-
hand side variable in a system generalized method of moments estimator (GMM).4 
The authors found that remittances have a positive effect on income growth in 
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countries with relatively low financial development, but then a negative effect on 
growth in countries with more developed financial sectors. To reach this conclusion, 
they used interactions between remittances and a handful of financial depth 
indicators from the banking sector (i.e., liquid liabilities, deposits, credit provided) 
on a sample of 73 countries in five-year average panels from 1975 – 2002.  
However, most extant empirical research tends to show negative effects of 
increased remittances on macro-development in developing countries. Using two 
ratios as instruments, a country’s income relative to US income and the country’s 
real interest rate relative to that of the US, Chami, Fullenkamp, and Jahjah (2003) 
found a negative relationship between remittances and per capita GDP growth in 83 
countries from 1970 to 1998. Here, normalizing the instruments by US income and 
interest rates are truthfully just two variants of a country’s income and interest rate 
and therefore most likely correlated with the dependent variable, income growth.  
Singh, Haacker, and Lee (2009) found a negative relationship between growth in 
remittances (as a ratio to GDP) and GDP growth in 36 sub-Saharan states from 2000 
– 2005 using fixed effects and internal lags in a GMM estimator to account for the 
endogeneity of remittances. Finally, employing the ratio of all other remittance-
receiving countries’ remittances to their total income, Barajas et al. (2009) also 
found a negative relationship between remittances and per capita GDP growth in a 
sample of 84 countries in five-year periods from 1970 to 2004. The authors argue 
that their instrument captures much of the exogenous portion of remittances by 
focusing on their determinants: for instance, trends in the decisions of whether and 
how much to remit and the transaction costs associated with doing so. By excluding 
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each country in question when calculating the value of its respective instrument, the 
authors contend that they are preserving the exogenous character of the 
instrument. 
With few exceptions, this body of mostly quantitative research tends to 
simplify development as wholly economic, with the implication that social progress 
will follow. In addition, most macroeconomic studies of remittances and their 
impacts fail to separate the three categories of remittances as defined by the Bretton 
Woods regime and thus (as discussed in Chapter One) conflate employees’ 
compensation and migrant’s transfers with workers’ remittances, when only the last 
category describes what most observers would consider remittances in the 
traditional sense (Barajas et al. 2009: 12-13).  Furthermore, save the last few 
examples and no matter the level of analysis, studies often fall short in addressing 
the potential endogeneity of the remittance and development question: were some 
(countries, households) already better off (more developed) – did increased 
opportunities lead to more emigration which in turn led to more remittances to 
become spuriously associated with higher levels of development?  
As explained in detail in Chapters Three and Four, I address all of these 
issues in turn. First, I define and operationalize development as social and economic, 
using education, health, and income indicators. Second, following the IMF (the IGO 
charged with collecting and classifying data on remittances), I isolate transnational 
worker’s remittances to represent what most people in theory and practice consider 
as “remittances”, and do not include cross-border compensation or one-time 
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movements of capital and assets. Lastly, I attend to potential endogeneity concerns 
through instrumental variables techniques, and thus account for the influences of 
remittance levels stemming from variation in initial levels of development across 
countries. 
THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT 
No matter the relative level of social and economic prosperity, many 
developing states realize that maintaining ties with their diasporas holds 
opportunities beyond remittances. Strategies for diaspora engagement are 
numerous and many governments are relative newcomers to the process. 
Government-diaspora relations are as diverse as they are numerous, and it is 
important to note that not all are positive. Some governments, such as Gabon and 
Zimbabwe effectively have negative relationships with their respective diasporas. 
Hopeful challengers of the Parti Democratique Gabonais (PDG) arguably have better 
relationships with the Gabonese Diaspora than the ruling PDG itself. Opponents 
often campaigned for funds and political support in Europe to challenge Omar 
Bongo’s six terms and over four decades as president (1967 – 2009) and continue to 
do so after his death and the subsequent ascendency of his son, Ali Bongo Ondimba, 
to the presidency (BBC 2009). In Zimbabwe, President Robert Mugabe has been 
known to “blast those Zimbabweans who migrate for economic reasons and send 
back remittances to their family members and relatives” rather than remaining at 
home and working toward development (Bracking and Sachikonye 2009: 214).  
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For the majority of countries that attempt to establish formal positive 
relations with their diasporas, the act of “institutionalizing” diaspora engagement by 
installing a national ministry or office dedicated to the diaspora is gaining 
popularity. In Africa, national bureaucratic units nominally dedicated to diaspora 
relations range from the “Diaspora Desk” under a Special Assistant to the President 
to the Ministère des Sénégalais de l'Extérieur or Ministry of Senegalese Abroad. 
Studies on the development impacts of diverse diaspora engagement efforts and 
institutional performance yield varied results but tend to cite similar challenges: a 
lack of capacity and coordination, a dearth of reliable data, unfamiliarity with 
diasporic interests, and domestic politics (African Diaspora Policy Centre (ADPC) 
2011; Aguinas 2009; Plaza 2009; Ratha et al. 2011: 173). Below I review existing 
knowledge on the structures and functions of national-level diaspora ministries, 
agencies, and offices before returning to the challenges they face in making 
engagement work for development.  
Part of a larger IOM effort, Aguinas (2009) considered 45 diaspora-engaging 
institutions across 30 developing countries (nine in Africa). Less than five years old, 
this represents the first systematic cross-country examination of these mostly new 
institutions. Aguinas found that most institutions operated at the national level as 
ministries, subministries, or special offices or committees. Most of these institutions 
are new and Aguinas points out high degrees of diversity in many aspects of their 
structures and functions: place within the government hierarchy, relative power, 
influence, resources, and effectiveness of each. Of the ministries some are dedicated 
to the diaspora as their sole mandate: for example, the Ministry of Diaspora 
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(Armenia) or the Ministry of Haitians Living Abroad. Others are hybrid or shared 
ministries such as Somalia’s Ministry for Diaspora and Community Affairs. The 
subministry level organizations are generally a vice ministry or directorate such as 
the Ethiopian Expatriate Affairs Directorate General in the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Other national offices and committees include the Interministerial 
Committee for Chilean Communities Abroad and the Office of the Diaspora serving 
Sierra Leone’s Office of the President (Aguinas 2009: 1-10). 
With a few notable exceptions, large-scale diaspora engagement programs 
and the further institutionalization of these efforts are a relatively new 
phenomenon. Most of the institutions in Aguinas’ report were created in the 2000s 
or the late 1990s. This makes judging their effectiveness difficult. A handful of 
countries offer evidence of earlier success at diaspora engagement, with or without 
an official government body nominally dedicated to the task. Israel since 1951 and 
India since 1991 have had successful diaspora bond programs.  Israel created the 
Development Corporation for Israel as a parastatal in 1951 with the sole charge of 
issuing its bonds, while India processes bonds through its central bank. Thus far, 
Israel and India have garnered at least $25 billion and $10 billion respectively 
(Ketkar and Ratha 2010). Through its Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State 
Council and other government bodies, China began to forge strong ties with its 
diaspora members following reforms in 1978 and now receives a substantial 
portion – estimated at almost 50 percent – of its foreign direct investment from 
expatriate communities (Bardouille 2008: 17).  
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Like the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, nascent organizations for diaspora 
engagement in other countries seldom act alone; they often operate within 
networks of other, more established ministries or offices, including consulates and 
embassies. Ghana’s Ministry of Tourism and Diaspora Relations, for example, works 
with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Women and Children’s Affairs, and Health and 
Education as well as the Ghana Statistical Service and the National Population 
Council (ADPC 2011: 7-8). These and more agencies have had success engaging the 
Ghanaian Diaspora in the US, the UK, and various continental European nations by 
encouraging not only more remittances through formal channels but also the 
finance of infrastructural education and health projects such as the building of 
middle schools and the maintenance of health clinics (Addison 2004).   
While most diaspora-engaging government offices seek to engage diasporans 
in development back home, some concentrate more acutely on the welfare of their 
expatriates abroad. The Ministry for Expatriate Welfare and Overseas Employment 
of Bangladesh and Egypt’s Ministry of Manpower and Emigration are two examples. 
These ministries focus on helping emigrants to secure work abroad (Aguinas 2009). 
Subministries, like the Department for Relations with Romanians Abroad under the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, tend to focus on the objectives of the mother agency. Of 
the 45 agencies Aguinas reviewed, she found no diaspora-engaging bodies directly 
under an agency directly responsible for development planning (2009: 8).  
For these reasons and more, the effectiveness of emergent diaspora 
engagement institutions across the developing world depend on their individual 
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mandates, their location in the bureaucracy, and the capacity of other government 
bodies as well as that of the government overall. These observations point to the 
challenges cited in extant reviews of the performance of such agencies. Comparing 
diaspora engagement agencies in Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal, the ADPC recently 
found three common obstacles, the first of which being a lack of consistency that 
comes with regime alternation. For example, Ghana’s Ministry of Tourism and 
Diaspora Relations lost the “and Diaspora Relations” from its name recently when a 
new administration took over. Though the actual mandate of the ministry did not 
change, this was a symbolic loss for Ghanaian government-diaspora relations. In 
Nigeria, President Obasanjo’s promotion of diaspora engagement crystallized into 
Nigerians in Diaspora Organization (NIDO) under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
2000. The new administration since 2009 “has not paid any particular attention to 
diaspora issues” (ADPC 2011: 10-14, quote from 14). Ratha et al. (2011) also find 
several diaspora engagement efforts abandoned through changes of government 
and failures to maintain programs over time in other cases (173).  
The second challenge the ADPC encountered was a lack of coordination – and 
thus, the absence of a centralized, clearly articulated strategy – among the various 
government agencies involved with the diaspora. Redundancies and “turf wars” 
abound in Senegal among many agencies – and unlike Nigeria or Ghana – Senegal 
has a ministry fully dedicated to diaspora relations (ADPC 2011: 15). Plaza (2009) 
also cites a lack of coordination between consulates and mainland government 
bodies in the arena of diaspora engagement.  
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A third obstacle is that no government has complete data on the locations of 
its diaspora (Plaza 2009). The ADPC report also found a paucity of data on the 
magnitude and geography of migration as well as remittances; the data that were 
available were sometimes contradictory in all three cases.  Finally, in the 
comprehensive report from Aguinas (2009), the author agrees that poor planning 
and coordination often stymie the effectiveness of new government agencies of the 
diaspora and offers more reasons: poor funding and a general lack of resources, and 
unfamiliarity with diaspora interests and abilities. More research is needed on these 
emergent institutions and their effectiveness at stimulating development through 
facilitating diaspora engagement.  
SUMMARY 
Earlier debates on the impacts of remittances and migration on development 
alternated between predominantly positive and negative assessments. In the new 
millennium, a more complex discourse embedded in global economic, social, and 
political transformations has emerged. This new discourse goes beyond previous 
dichotomies and identifies the complex and diverse impacts of transnational 
remittances in Africa and the developing world.  Previous ebbs and flows of ideas 
surrounding migration and its impacts on development in origin states and areas 
reflected not only paradigm shifts in development theory, but conditions and events 
in the international political economy as well. Orthodox economic theories saw 
migration as an at least partial answer to the development quagmire in which many 
states were embroiled in the 1950s and 1960s. Dependency theorists and historical-
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structuralists saw the spread and eventual primacy of capitalism in the international 
political economy as the straw that broke the proverbial camel’s back in chronically 
underdeveloped countries. Trapped in subordinate roles, the migration of citizens 
or their potential remittances cannot help buoy ships that were perpetually sinking. 
Indeed, for dependency theorists, migration depletes scarce resources – labor and 
capital – and can further entrench origin countries and regions into 
underdevelopment.  
Proponents of the NELM see things somewhat differently. Households, not 
individuals, make decisions about migration based on diversification of risks and 
opportunities. In developing countries with unreliable credit markets and insurance 
provisions – if any – migration of one or more household members while others stay 
behind can be a survival strategy, or even one for prosperity. Remittances can be 
used as insurance, but also as investment capital, to improve or diversify production 
in households. Transnational approaches see remittances, transmigrants, and others 
at “home” (whether it be families or communities) as part of larger transnational 
networks. Advances in technology have arguably made migration and the 
construction of transnational spaces easier, both economically and psychologically. 
Remittances can help meet subsistence needs or even larger aspirations but are 
neither inherently good nor bad for development in places of origin; rather they are 
subject to the actors and sociocultural, economic, and political institutions in 
various locations.  
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Empirical research on the impacts of transnational remittances on 
development has exploded in the last two decades due to absolute growth in these 
flows as well as their relative growth and levels when compared to other 
transnational flows like aid and FDI. A slight majority of studies of remittances uses 
the household as unit of analysis and finds that those receiving remittances are 
generally better off or made better off by remittances. Results from macroeconomic 
studies tend to point the other direction and conclude remittances are inhibitive for 
national growth. Most of these studies narrowly define development as solely 
economic and/or inaccurately measure remittances, and in doing the latter capture 
amounts that are not remittances in the traditionally accepted sense. Finally, 
ministries and other government agencies charged with engaging the diaspora in 
national development efforts are a relatively new phenomenon and come in all 
shapes and sizes. Perhaps because of their recentness and in spite of their diversity, 
many face common challenges: namely political inconsistencies, lack of 
intergovernmental coordination, and a lack of funding and general resources. Listed 
together, the obstacles for these new governmental diaspora ministries and 
agencies read like a list of the “usual suspects” that plague most (development) 
efforts in underdeveloped countries.   
So what are the development impacts of transnational remittances and the 
institutionalization of diaspora engagement in Africa? Does “development from 
abroad” exist and if so can it occur in the face of the challenges seemingly inherent 
to many African governments? In the next chapter I describe the growth of 
transnational remittances to the continent over the last few decades at many levels 
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of analysis. I also investigate the recent trend of institutionalizing diaspora 
engagement for development and the establishment of ministries and other 
agencies.   
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NOTES: CHAPTER TWO
 
1 As discussed throughout the chapter, for decades much theoretical work considered migration (and 
remittances) as either “good” for development, i.e., emigrants would return home with more 
resources,  or “bad” for development, i.e., emigrants either would not return (brain and brawn-drain) 
or return with new skills and preferences unmatched by conditions in the home country. More 
recently, debates have included more emphasis on the diverse and context-specific causes and 
impacts of migration and remittances.  
2 Hereafter I will use only household – as does much of the literature – to identify the unit of analysis 
in the NELM for brevity and consistency.  
3 Hometown associations are collective organizations of immigrants usually from a localized area (i.e. 
towns, cities, regions) in the home country who raise money and other forms of support, as well as 
awareness of sociopolitical issues back home. They work with host and home country governments, 
other citizens groups, and nongovernmental organizations toward their goal of bettering the social, 
economic, and political conditions in the home country.  
4 The GMM estimator from Arellano and Bover (1995) is generally accepted in the econometric 
literature as a valid instrumental technique, so long as the data exist for the adequate order and 
number of lags. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
REMITTANCES AND DIASPORA INSTITUTIONS IN AFRICA 
Often, citizens see more opportunities to improve their lives and enlarge 
their capabilities – and those of family members – in neighboring countries or those 
farther away. Indeed, the perception of increased opportunities is (an at least 
implicit) motivation of emigration in all the theoretical frameworks in the 
migration-development literature discussed in the previous chapter.1 Rates of 
international migration are rising, and this phenomenon undoubtedly influences 
(and is influenced by) development at home.  
In this chapter, I review the current state of migration, remittances, and 
governmental diaspora institutions in Africa. The next section describes rates of 
migration and remittance across the continent, including discussions of the political 
economy of remittances: informal v. formal channels of remittance, the distribution 
of money transfer operators (MTOs), and issues of precision and accuracy in 
measuring and comparing remittances. Section three considers the proliferation of 
diaspora ministries and agencies in Africa, their missions, accomplishments, and 
challenges; the last section provides a summary.   
MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES 
The latest estimates for countries’ international migrant stocks are from the 
World Bank and were calculated for 2010 (World Bank 2013a).  Compilers note the 
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challenges to collecting data on international migrants – different classifications of 
residents and citizens and different collection practices across countries, and of 
course the issue of illegal or undocumented migration.  They admit that “any 
comparison of migrant stocks will be less than perfect. There is little choice but to 
collect the data that individual countries themselves compile in its rawest form, 
despite the heterogeneity that exists, and record it” (Parsons et al. 2005: 11). The 
data come from a variety of country sources like censuses and population registers 
along with original surveys and secondary sources from international institutions 
like the OECD, the UN, and the International Labor Organization. They are then 
checked against the latest migrant stocks reported by the UN Population Division 
(Ratha and Shaw 2007).  
The estimates indicate that around 30 million Africans (3 percent) reside in a 
country other than that of their origin. Many if not most Africans who emigrate 
remain in Africa (Tables A3.A-E in the appendix show the top five emigration 
destinations for each country). Two-thirds of sub-Saharan emigrants stay south of 
the Sahara and most of those remain in the respective sub-region (Ratha et al 2011: 
1-2). Seventy-three countries have over 10,000 emigrants of African origin and 40 of 
these countries are in Africa. Figure 3.1 shows the top destination countries for 
African emigrants. The second largest destination is Côte d’Ivoire, with over 2 
million African emigrants, mostly from neighboring Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea.2 
South Africa is home to almost 2 million emigrant Africans and Burkina Faso and 
Nigeria each have around 1 million. Outside of Africa, with almost 10 percent of 
Africa’s emigrants, France is the top destination country for Africans. Saudi Arabia, 
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the US, and the UK also have relatively large stocks of African emigrants, 
representing around five percent of emigrating Africans each. These transplanted 
Africans significantly impact both the development trends in their host countries 
where they provide labor and skills and in their home countries to which they send 
remittance.  
 
FIGURE 3.1 MIGRATION DESTINATION COUNTRIES, 2010 ESTIMATES 
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It is significant that in 2010 the 30 million African emigrants sent almost $47 
billion home in remittances through formal services and institutions. The average 
quantity for individual remittance transactions to African recipients was about $100 
sent monthly. Of this amount, an estimated 80 percent is spent on basic needs for 
the family: for food, housing, education, and healthcare (Bardouille 2008: 13). 
Measuring exact inflows of remittances remains virtually impossible due partly to 
differences in categorizing and reporting methods across countries. More 
importantly, though, the difficulty in obtaining precise figures of remittance is due 
to the frequent resort to informal channels by emigrants relying on familial, 
communal, and/or regional networks.   
INFORMAL VERSUS FORMAL REMITTANCE IN AFRICA 
Informal money transfer networks have a long history in Africa, Asia, and the 
Middle East, and many channels employed today are part of or modeled after the 
centuries-old institutions of hawala and hundi. Meaning ‘transfer’ in Arabic, the 
former describes the (mostly) Middle Eastern practice of physically carrying cash or 
other objects of value between places, usually across borders. The latter, hundi, has 
a similar connotation on the South Asian subcontinent. These systems can include 
informal bank drafts of transfer, for which cash need not be immediately or directly 
transported but rather dispensed through informal accounts of debts and credits 
among families or extra-familial networks (Sander and Maimbo 2008: 65-66). Four 
major conditions contribute to the persistence of informal channels in Africa. First, 
relatively few financial institutions are allowed to handle remittances as officially 
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licensed money transfer operators (MTOs). Second, formal channels are often cost-
prohibitive due at least partly to a lack of competition and third, mistrust and 
instability of governmental and formal economic institutions – though perhaps 
improving – are common. Lastly, many Africans are “unbanked”: the proportion of 
those who do not use banks is higher than in any other region.  
The post 9-11 period introduced a major barrier-to-entry into the remittance 
market in Africa when the Bretton Woods Institutions declared stringent 
international financial regulations toward anti-money laundering and combating 
the financing of terrorism (AML-CFT), also referred to as ‘know-your-customer’ 
(KYC) rules. These rules involve the uniform documentation for transnational 
capital in the wake of the September 11 attacks on the US. Although relatively 
effective at curbing money-laundering and identifying possible terrorist-financing 
schemes, they also hinder legitimate workers’ use of formal institutions to send 
money internationally to families back home (IMF 2005). These rules are often cost-
prohibitive when smaller MTOs and micro-finance institutions need to procure 
licenses for international transfers. Ironically, the KYC rules play a role in the 
perpetuation of informally transmitted remittance, though anti-terrorist financing 
and anti-money-laundering are their chief raisons-d’être.  
Some African MTOs have persevered through the changes in international 
finance regulation and others have begun or expanded service more recently. 
Dahabshil started in Somalia over 40 years ago and is now headquartered in United 
Arab Emirates, with outlets in 150 countries including those in the horn of Africa 
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and over 220 outlets in Somalia (Dahabshil 2013). For inter-African transfers, 
Ecobank, based in Lome, Togo, has over 750 locations in 32 African countries3 and 
France (Ecobank 2013). Safaricom in Kenya has partnered with Western Union 
through its M-Pesa program to extend the successful domestic mobile phone 
banking and money transfer services internationally to 45 countries including the 
US and Canada, most countries in Europe and the Arabian Peninsula, and 13 African 
countries.4 In 2009, Nigeria’s Virtual Terminal Network (VTN) began a similar 
partnership with Western Union to offer mobile transfers (Safaricom 2013; VTN 
2013).  
Despite the existence of these and other regional MTOs in Africa, two of the 
oldest companies in the business, Western Union and MoneyGram, control 65 
percent of payout locations in Africa. Both companies also seek (and generally 
obtain) exclusivity agreements with bank and post office partners, essentially 
barring competition in many African countries and keeping fees associated with 
remittance high (IFAD 2010). At least partly due to pressure from diaspora groups, 
governments (including Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, and Rwanda) have recently begun 
to ban the exclusivity agreements in efforts to increase competition and bring down 
remittance prices (Ratha et al 2011). However, with over 30,000 and 20,000 outlets 
in Africa respectively, Western Union and MoneyGram continue to dominate the 
remittance market.  
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FIGURE 3.2 WESTERN UNION AND MONEYGRAM OUTLETS, AFRICA 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 shows the combined distribution of Western Union and 
MoneyGram payout locations in Africa by country (Table A3.F in the appendix 
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shows the estimated number of locations by country)5. Unsurprisingly, the number 
of outlets is highly correlated with the amount of remittances a country receives.6 In 
countries with a dearth of Western Union and MoneyGram outlets like Eritrea and 
Somalia (22 and four outlets respectively), one or a few smaller, regional MTOs 
generally fill the gap. Transhorn Money Transfer specializes in sending money to 
Asmara and other Eritrean locales, and as mentioned above, Dahabshil pays out 
remittances in over 200 Somali locations (Transhorn Money Transfer 2013).  
However, most countries have an abundance of Western Union and 
MoneyGram locations. Of the ten countries with over 1,000 outlets, Morocco and 
Nigeria (two of the top remittance earners) have over 12,000 and 8,000 payout 
locations respectively, far more than the other 52 countries. With around 3,000 
outlets, Ghana, Ethiopia, and Senegal round out the top five most saturated 
countries in terms of Western Union and MoneyGram locations.  
The near duopolistic market helps to make Africa the most expensive place 
for remittances in the world. Compared to other regions, Africa endures relatively 
high costs, from 8 to 12 percent more for receiving remittances (Bardouille 2008: 
11). For example, sending $200 from the US to Pakistan or The Philippines currently 
costs 7 to 8 percent via MoneyGram and Western Union. The same amount from the 
US to Ghana incurs 11 percent (MoneyGram) and 18 percent (Western Union) 
charges respectively (World Bank 2011c). Also, intra-African transfers are even 
more costly than those from outside the continent and can take longer to process. 
To send the same amount to Zambia from the UK or South Africa costs 15 percent 
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and 25 percent on average respectively. Furthermore, sending money from South 
Africa to Lesotho (consequently surrounded by the former) costs on average 12 
percent of the amount sent (IFAD 2010).   
The wait times and high fees associated with remittances are so quotidian 
and ubiquitous that they have found their way into popular culture. Somali rapper 
K’naan’s 2009 song “15 Minutes Away” is dedicated to “‘everybody that’s had to wait 
on a money transfer’ and complains, ‘it’s kind of wack when they charge you like 10 
percent on the dollar’” (Terry 2013). In 2009, the G8 adopted the “5X5” objective, 
aimed at reducing average global remittance costs by five percent (from ten to five 
percent) in five years (by 2014). The initiative invites governments to adopt policies 
and practices proven effective in helping to reduce remittance costs such as 
increasing transparency and enhancing competition (Italian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2009).7 Four years later, the global average cost of remittance has decreased, 
though only by a meager one percent (currently 9.05 percent), suggesting that “5X5” 
goal may have been overly ambitious (World Bank 2013c).  Furthermore, for Africa, 
remittance prices have increased from 11 to 12 percent since 2011 (Send Money 
Africa 2013). The impacts of these high costs are well-known: “[b]ringing 
remittance prices down to 5 percent from the current 12.4 percent average cost 
would put US$4 billion more in the pockets of Africa's migrants and their families 
who rely on remittances for survival” (World Bank 2013d). All else equal, this would 
represent a 10 percent increase in formal remittances to the continent. 
Undoubtedly, lowering remittance prices in Africa and increasing use of formal 
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channels will require enhanced competition for Western Union and MoneyGram 
from other MTOs and the phasing out of exclusivity agreements.  
It is not surprising then that informal remittance structures persist, not only 
in the face of high fees, but also vis-à-vis political instability and/or unreliable 
national macroeconomic environments and practices. When banks are 
intermittently or consistently weak, or when remittance is subject to high direct 
taxation or multiple fee collections, informal institutions can seem a better option 
for remittance senders and receivers. The outcome is that lack of trust in the public 
sector is offset with the trust in personal, face-to-face relationships on each end of 
informal remittance transactions.  
In general, banks and financial sectors in Africa have become more stable 
over the last two decades, which eventually should encourage more citizens to use 
formal channels for remittances (Honohan and Beck 2007). However, infrastructure 
remains a challenge, and Africans are the least “banked” population in the world. 
Figure 3.3 compares commercial bank use and access across the world’s four 
developing regions using country averages. Almost 30 percent (295 per 1,000) of 
adults in Africa deposit or borrow from banks, just behind the proportion in the 
more populous Asia/Pacific region. Africans are less than half as likely to use banks 
as citizens in Eastern Europe/Central Asia and Latin America.  
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FIGURE 3.3 BANK USE AND ACCESS: DEVELOPING REGION COMPARISONS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Financial literacy programs can help to encourage more citizens to make use 
of banks. Studies of financial literacy programs in Eastern Europe and Latin America 
show that after receiving financial education 80 percent of unbanked people express 
new interest in using banks (IFAD 2010: 16).  Such programs are less pervasive but 
becoming more popular across Africa, wherein public and/or private actors (i.e., 
national credit regulators and microfinance associations) provide workshops or air 
media messages educating the public about financial institutions in countries such 
as Kenya, South Africa, Tunisia, and Uganda (Beck et al 2011: 106). 
While financial literacy programs can be successful at increasing interest in 
using formal institutions, infrastructure remains a challenge in many African 
countries. On average, fewer than 50 commercial bank branches and ATMs are 
available for every 1,000,000 adults (one bank outlet for every 20,000 adults), a 
figure much lower than the other three developing regions (Figure 3.3).  While 
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mobile banking programs (like Kenya’s M-Pesa discussed above) have been 
successful and could represent an opportunity for African countries to “leap-frog” 
some infrastructural deficiencies, increasing access to physical branches and ATMs 
could also encourage more citizens to use banks and expand options for sending and 
receiving remittance through formal channels.   
MEASURING FORMAL REMITTANCE FLOWS 
Only formal flows of remittance can be measured as a proxy for total 
remittances; and measuring formal flows is complicated by inconsistent reporting 
on the part of governments. Remittance reporting is intermittent at best for many 
African countries, with no clear pattern (based on income, government type, etc.) 
emerging among those who do report remittances to the IMF and those who do not 
for a given year or all years. Of 53 countries, any number from 21 to 40 of them 
reported remittances each year from 1980 through 2010.  
The top chart in Figure 3.4 shows remittances in Africa for the last three 
decades (the solid line), along with the number of countries reporting remittances 
each year (the dashed line). Plotting both on the same graph allows readers to see 
the influence of inconsistent reporting on the actual amount reported. To better 
measure increases in remittances to the continent one should consider the average 
levels within countries and compare those over time. The bottom left chart in Figure 
3.4 does this.  Median levels of remittance have increased over time, especially in 
the last decade when the average grew over fourfold from below $20 million to $80 
million.8  The bottom right chart shows remittances as a percent of income. The 
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solid line shows the aggregate value for all countries reporting while the dashed line 
represents the median remittances by country as a percent of income. Both of these 
measures have also increased since 2000, with the median percentage more than 
doubling from 0.66 percent to 1.72 percent in one decade, meaning that remittances 
are garnering a larger portion of African income.   
FIGURE 3.4 REMITTANCES AND INCOME, 1980 – 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Also interesting in the bottom two charts (Figure 3.4) are the large spikes in 
both remittances and remittances as a percent of income in the early 1990s. The 
lion’s share of this short-term rise can be traced back to four countries: Ghana, 
Madagascar, Mauritania, and Nigeria. Figure 3.5 shows changes to remittances and 
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to income in the 1990s for all four countries. Flooding, ethnic conflicts in the north, 
and bureaucratic restructuring during the transition to democracy saw Ghana’s 
income fall by 14 percent in 1993 (Aryeetey, Fosu, and Bawumia 2001). At least 
partly in response to these processes, remittances rose by 38 and 55 percent in 
1993 and 1994 to $10 and $16 million respectively. Interestingly, in 1996, during 
the country’s second democratic elections, remittances rose again by 60 percent to 
$27.5 million. In Madagascar – aided by a 95 percent increase in remittances, from 
$4.5 to almost $9 million – pro-democracy strikes and demonstrations in 1991 
against the socialist quasi-military government resulted in the dissolution of 
government by then president, Didier Ratsiraka. A new, democratic constitution 
would be ratified the following year, but uncertainty during the political transition 
saw income fall 15 percent (Banks, Miller, and Overstreet 2007: 524-526).  
FIGURE 3.5 REMITTANCE SPIKES IN THE 1990S 
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The introduction of a preferential exchange rate in Mauritania in late 1991 
saw an increase in remittances in 1992: from just over $1 million to $5 million. The 
rate was eliminated in 1993 and remittances fell by 95 percent (IMF 1995). The 
country’s first multiparty elections were also held in 1992 (Banks, Miller, and 
Overstreet 2077: 572). Though Nigeria also held elections in its year of marked 
increase in remittances, 1993, much of the dramatic spike – from $56 to almost 
$800 million – is most likely due to sweeping economic reforms in 1993 that freed 
interest rates and introduced new tax structures. This and the subsequent 
depreciation of the Nigerian currency made dollars and sterling pounds more 
valuable inside Nigeria. The exchange rate for Nigerian Naira doubled from under 
N10 per $1 to N22 per $1 from 1991 – 1993 and has continued to increase 
incrementally,  much like remittances, ever since (Imimole and Enoma 2011).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nigeria, with over 360,000 (approximately one-third) of its emigrants in the 
UK and the US receives the most remittances in Africa (see Table A3.E in the 
TABLE 3.A TOP 10 REMITTANCE RECEIVERS, 2010 
By Gross Remittance 
 
By Percent of GNI 
Country 
Remittance 
 (millions) (%  GNI) 
 
Country 
Remittance 
(millions) (% GNI) 
Nigeria $19,651 10.9% 
 
Gambia $107 11.4% 
Egypt $12,453 5.7% 
 
Senegal $1,384 11.0% 
Morocco $6,423 6.9% 
 
Nigeria $19,650 10.9% 
Tunisia $1,725 4.1% 
 
Togo $301 9.5% 
Senegal $1,384 11.0% 
 
Cape Verde $130 8.4% 
Sudan $1,291 1.7% 
 
Morocco $6,423 6.9% 
Uganda $768 4.6% 
 
Egypt $12,453 5.7% 
Kenya $686 2.1% 
 
Guinea-Bissau $44 5.4% 
Mali $437 4.8% 
 
Mali $437 4.8% 
Ethiopia $345 1.3% 
 
Uganda $768 4.6% 
Source: World Bank 2011 
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appendix). As shown in Table 3.A it received almost $20 billion in 2010 (Table A3.G 
in the appendix contains data for all reporting countries). As of 2006, sixty percent 
of Nigeria’s remittances were sent to Lagos, and 15 percent go to Abuja, leaving only 
25 percent received directly in the vast remainder of the country. However, some of 
these remitted funds are forwarded inland from principal cities via informal 
channels such as taxi and bus drivers or family members (Hernandez-Coss and Bun 
2006: 13). Five other countries received over $1 billion: Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, 
Senegal, and Sudan.  
The right side of Table 3.C shows the 10 countries with the highest 
percentages of remittances to income indicating higher degrees of remittance 
dependence. Cape Verde, Senegal, and Nigeria receive more than 10 percent of gross 
national income from remittances. Cape Verde and The Gambia are ranked fifth and 
first and these two countries lose the largest percentages of tertiary-educated 
citizens in Africa: 67.5 percent (Cape Verde) and 63.3 percent (The Gambia), 
indicative of brain-drain (World Bank 2011b). Eight other countries lose more than 
35 percent of their skilled labor: Mauritius (56 percent), Seychelles (56 percent), 
Sierra Leone (53 percent), Ghana (47 percent), Mozambique (45 percent), Liberia 
(45 percent), Kenya (38 percent) and Uganda (36 percent) (Lututala 2012: 6).On 
average, African countries lose 19 percent of their doctors (IOM 2009). In the US 
alone, 2009 census results indicated 1.5 million African emigrants who, on average, 
were more skilled than both other immigrants and non-immigrants. Even though 
remittances may slightly mitigate the negative impacts of emigration from African 
countries, the brain-drain “denies, in short, the continent of the human, financial, 
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economic and political capital needed to advance its development and the 
contributions of migrants to the development of their countries of origin do not 
seem to offset the initial consequences of brain-drain” (Lututala 2012: 18).  
GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE DIASPORA 
By and large, members of the diaspora do maintain socioeconomic and 
political ties with their home countries. Thus it is not surprising that governments 
have begun to formulate policies to formalize and institutionalize these linkages. 
Two-thirds of African states have created an office, subministry, shared ministry, or 
ministry of the diaspora.9 Following Aguinas (2009) as discussed in Chapter Two, I 
categorize these institutions by their respective places in the government 
bureaucracy. Ministries are full ministries in the cabinet nominally dedicated to the 
diaspora, such as Cape Verde’s Ministry of Emigrant Communities or Morocco’s 
Ministry in Charge of Moroccans Living Abroad. Shared Ministries are ministries 
that have multiple areas of responsibility which include diaspora relations, like 
Guinea-Bissau’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation, and the 
Diaspora or Ghana’s Ministry of Tourism and Diaspora Relations. Subministries are 
departments or directorates within a ministry, like Burundi’s Directorate of the 
Diaspora or Nigeria’s Nigerians in the Diaspora Organization. All of the 
subministries in African governments are located in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
or its equivalent. Finally, other offices are those housed outside the cabinet. 
Currently, there are three such offices: Malawi’s Diaspora Affairs Unit and Sierra 
Leone’s Office of the Diaspora, both of which are in the Office of the President, and 
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Zambia’s Diaspora Desk, located in the Office of the Special Assistant to the 
President, Economic and Development Affairs.  
FIGURE 3.4 THE RISE OF GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE DIASPORA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 highlights the rapid growth of governmental diaspora-engaging 
institutions in Africa. At the start of 2013, five countries have a full ministry, nine 
countries have a shared ministry, and the most common type of governmental 
diaspora institution is the subministry, created by 19 countries. Table A3.H in the 
appendix shows the full list of governmental diaspora institutions. Some institutions 
have been reshuffled since their creation. Tunisia created a subministry in the 
Ministry of Social Affairs in 1988, which was the first on the continent. In 2005, the 
ministry was redesigned as the Ministry of Social Affairs, Solidarity, and Tunisians 
Abroad (Tunisian Government 2013). Cape Verde created an Institute of Emigrant 
Communities in 2001 in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and replaced it with the full 
Ministry of Emigrant Communities in 2010 (ICMPD and IOM 2010).10 The newest (as 
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of early 2014) is Equatorial Guinea’s Directorate of the Diaspora in its Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs created in the spring of 2013. Table 3.B lists the countries by type of 
institution.  
TABLE 3.B COUNTRIES BY TYPE OF DIASPORA INSTITUTION, 2013 
  
 
 
 
 
 
The missions of the various institutions are diverse and mostly expressed as 
broad ambitions for the future. Most of them contain some reference to involving 
the diaspora in the development or the socioeconomic activities of the country. For 
instance, Sierra Leone’s Office of the Diaspora created in 2007 is meant to harness 
the potential in the diaspora to address “critical capacity gaps in the government” 
and the Ministry of Diaspora and Community Relations in Somalia created in 2009 
plans to set up departments that focus on financial and human resources in the 
diaspora for Somalia (Martin 2009: 9).  
Ethiopia’s Diaspora Engagement Affairs General Directorate has in its 
mission that it “Encourages the active involvement of the Ethiopians in Diaspora in 
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socio-economic activities of the country” (Ethiopian Government 2009). While Plaza 
(2009) cites that governments’ lack of data on the size and location of their 
diasporas is a major challenge for diaspora-engaging institutions, Ethiopia’s 
government holds that a central obstacle for contributions from its diasporans is a 
“lack of accurate and up to date information about the country’s development 
policies” (Ethiopian Government 2011: 5). Essentially, the lack of reliable data and 
information exists for all actors, governments and expatriates alike. To address this 
issue, the General Directorate for Diaspora Engagement Affairs within the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs works with its satellite offices, consulates, and other federal 
ministries to identify and interact with diaspora groups in many countries. The 
General Directorate has also published the document “Basic Information for 
Ethiopians in the Diaspora” (2011) available on the Foreign Ministry website or in 
person at the Ministry in Addis Ababa, regional Ministry offices, and consulates. This 
document provides information on tax regulations, diaspora ID cards, foreign 
currency accounts for both individuals and companies with Ethiopian-based banks, 
investment incentives, available MTOs, and guidelines for the country’s second 
diaspora bond project, the Grand Renaissance Dam Bond, which is marketed toward 
expatriates as well as citizens at home.  
Through conversations with representatives of the Ethiopian Foreign 
Ministry and its offices in the summer of 2013, it seems they are hopeful that 
making the basic information available will stimulate personal and commercial 
investments from expatriates. A common point of pride concerning the Grand 
Renaissance Dam Project is that it will be 100 percent funded by the Ethiopian 
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people, at home and abroad. While diaspora groups in North America and Europe 
hold fundraisers in support of the dam – in 2013, Ethiopians in Vancouver, Canada 
raised over $100,000 – others refuse to invest in the project citing a corrupt and 
continually undemocratic regime in Addis Ababa (Derassa and Mbuka 2013; Jemal 
2013).  
As the example of the Diaspora Affairs General Directorate in Ethiopia and its 
efforts to involve expatriates in the dam project illustrate, the social construction of 
a monolithic, united “diaspora” as a force for development at home should not 
overshadow the reality of diverse needs, skills, and views held by a nation’s 
expatriates. This observation supports Plaza’s (2009) finding that a lack of 
knowledge about the diaspora is a major impediment to the success of government 
diaspora-engaging institutions. The majority of these institutions, having only 
recently come into existence, lack true capacity to affect change in government-
diaspora coordination, and the list of measurable accomplishments is modest. 
Inconsistencies brought about by regime alterations and a lack of intra-bureaucratic 
coordination that often creates redundancies further hamper productivity in these 
nascent institutions (see Chapter Two).  
To this end, the African Diaspora Policy Centre (ADPC) based in the 
Netherlands has recently begun a series of capacity-building workshops for leaders 
and staff of governmental diaspora institutions in Africa. In 2010 and 2011, 
representatives from six countries attended the first and second workshops in 
Accra: Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, and Rwanda (ADPC 2011). Planning 
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for more workshops is underway. During the workshops, politicians and 
bureaucrats were able to network and learn of examples of best practices such as 
the Diaspora Corporate Bond (National Bank of Ethiopia), the Tax-Relief for Non-
resident Indians Scheme, and the Matching Fund from Mexican HTAs supported by 
the Mexican Government (ADPC 2011: 5). Also at the workshops, participants 
indicated needs for received direct technical assistance in drafting national strategy 
papers for migration and development that could be translated into policy. 
Participants also noted the need for strengthening the capacity of regional bodies 
such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in terms of 
managing and documenting migration, and better overall documentation of past and 
present efforts from African governments to mobilize their diasporas (ADPC 2011). 
To date, many of these new institutions have been meeting with diaspora groups in 
major destination countries to assess the capabilities, potential strategies, and needs 
of the diaspora in prospective partnerships and mutual projects (Kenyan Embassy, 
Washington DC 2011; Martin 2009: 9). High hopes are expressed for a development-
oriented linkage between African governments and their far-flung diasporic 
communities as well as their productive emigrants on the continent. The 
institutional fragilities of the new governmental ministries and offices represent 
difficult but not impossible hurdles for development goals. Strengthening 
associational linkages between diasporas and home governments represent a new 
frontier in national (and possibly international) policies for development. 
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SUMMARY 
Over 30 million Africans have emigrated from their countries of origin, 
moving within and beyond the continent’s sub-regions. Average remittances for 
African countries in 2000 were below $20 million but reached $80 million by 2010. 
Reported amounts received in 2010 ranged from just over $200,000 in Liberia to 
almost $20 billion in Nigeria. Remittances are now larger than foreign aid to Africa 
and represent a large portion of incoming transnational capital, and that is only 
when measuring formally transferred flows. Lack of trust in public and private 
banks, along with high costs and urban concentration of licensed MTOs reinforce 
informal transfers through more traditional and diverse extra-familial hawala 
networks. Remittances respond not only to exchange rate fluctuations, but to times 
of high political importance, conflicts, and disasters. 
African governments are recognizing the volume of remittances as well as 
other resources from their diasporas and are beginning to formally institutionalize 
relations with them (Aguinas 2009). The number of national level governmental 
institutions of the diaspora has grown from a handful in 2000 to at least 36 in 2013, 
ranging from offices under the president to fully dedicated ministries. Though the 
tangible accomplishments of these nascent organizations are relatively few, many 
have reached out to their diasporas in top destination countries and begun to work 
with regional organizations to coordinate efforts in engaging diasporas for 
development. 
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Can these new governmental diaspora ministries and offices succeed in 
utilizing the technical, financial, and social resources of their expatriates toward 
development in home countries? How does the now $40 billion annually in 
transnational remittance to Africa affect development processes and projects? Does 
the relocation through migration of, in many cases, a country’s best and brightest 
tend to slow processes of development? To shed light on these questions, the next 
chapter describes development in Africa, and quantitatively models the relationship 
between development, remittances, and governmental diaspora institutions over 
the last two decades.   
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NOTES: CHAPTER THREE 
 
1 This of course, is not inclusive of involuntary migrants and one need only point to the millions of 
Liberian, Somali, and Sudanese refugees of conflict to assert that migration is not always a choice and 
needs little “motivation” than survival itself. 
2 Côte d’Ivoire was for decades a net immigration country largely due to its thriving cocoa and 
construction sectors, until a military coup in 1999 and the ensuing political violence and uncertainty. 
Since 2000, Côte d’Ivoire has been a net emigration country, due mostly to political refugees and 
others fleeing ethnic conflict. It remains, however, a top destination for emigrants from its neighbors 
(Arthur 1991; CIA 2013; IOM 2009).  
3 Ecobank serves the following African countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape 
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Niger, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, 
Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  
4 Countries and territories where M-Pesa has partnered with Western Union to offer mobile transfer 
services are: American Samoa, Bahrain, Belgium, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Guam, Hong Kong,  
Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mali, Netherlands, Niger, Northern Mariana Islands,  
Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Tanzania, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Yemen, and 
Zambia. 
5 I estimated the number of Western Union and MoneyGram locations from the companies’ websites 
and the searchable databases of available payout locations in each country.  
6 The combined number of Western Union and MoneyGram outlets in African countries is correlated 
with the annual remittance receipts with a Pearson’s r of 0.69. A bivariate regression of the number 
of outlets on remittances produces an R-squared of 0.48 and predicts a five percent increase in the 
number of outlets from a ten percent increase in remittances. 
7 The official aims of the G8’s “5X5” objective are: 
“a) fostering market transparency and consumer protection; 
b) improving the payment systems infrastructure; 
c) reforming the legal and regulatory framework; 
d) enhancing market structure and competition; 
e) adopting governance and risk management best practices” (Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2009).  
8 For the 24 countries that reported remittances in both 2000 and 2010, the median amount of 
remittances grew fivefold from $22 million to $113 million during the decade. 
9 All of these data regarding governmental institutions of the diaspora are the result of copious 
searches of various country sources including constitutions, decrees, and country websites.   
10 The ICMDP is the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (an international 
organization created in 1993 by Austria and Switzerland (www.icmdp.org) and the IOM is the 
International Organization for Migration and self-described “principal intergovernmental 
organization in the field of migration” (www.iom.int). 
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TABLE A3.A CENTRAL AFRICA, TOP FIVE EMIGRATION DESTINATIONS, 2010 
Country Top Destination Destination 2 Destination 3 Destination 4 Destination 5 
Angola 
Portugal Zambia Namibia Other South France 
46% (245,650) 18% (93,496) 13% (67,540) 4% (22,868) 4% (18,906) 
Cameroon 
France Chad Gabon US Nigeria 
24% (68,250) 17% (48,547) 12% (33,876) 10% (26,912) 9% (25,296) 
CAR 
Chad France Other South Congo  Netherlands 
69% (88,978) 11% (13,945) 9% (12,113) 8% (10,567) 1% (970) 
Chad 
Cameroon Sudan CAR Nigeria Other South 
29% (71,134) 23% (56,660) 17% (40,683) 11% (27,442) 10% (24,209) 
Dem. Congo  
Rwanda Uganda Congo  Belgium Other South 
41% (372,964) 9% (85,476) 9% (78,458) 8% (76,870) 8% (75,875) 
Côte d'Ivoire 
Burkina Faso Other South Mali France Italy 
72% (842,931) 10% (113,393) 7% (77,549) 6% (71,334) 2% (22,276) 
Eq. Guinea 
Gabon Spain Other South Nigeria Congo  
61% (62,711) 24% (24,829) 8% (8,298) 5% (4,772) 1% (531) 
Gabon 
France Mali Other South Congo  US 
58% (14,615) 19% (4,748) 3% (790) 3% (649) 2% (600) 
São T & P 
Portugal Angola Cape Verde Other South Spain 
49% (17,612) 32% (11,532) 11% (4,061) 5% (1,889) 1% (248) 
World Bank Estimates. Percentage is percent of total migrants, number of migrants in parentheses; 
African destination countries bolded. “Other South” refers to unspecified destinations in Global South. 
Source: World Bank 2013a 
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TABLE A3.B EASTERN AFRICA, TOP FIVE EMIGRATION DESTINATIONS, 2010 
Country Top Destination Destination 2 Destination 3 Destination 4 Destination 5 
Burundi 
Tanzania Uganda Rwanda Other South Belgium 
42% (151,313) 29% (101,826) 13% (44,785) 10% (36,071) 1% (4,991) 
Comoros 
France Madagascar Tanzania Egypt  Other South 
70% (26,951) 17% (6,692) 4% (1,671) 4% (1,491) 3% (1,195) 
Djibouti 
France Ethiopia Canada Other South Egypt  
48% (6,489) 28% (3,768) 5% (630) 4% (527) 4% (494) 
Eritrea 
Sudan Ethiopia Other South Saudi Arabia Italy 
49% (458,042) 31% (290,383) 10% (90,688) 4% (40,644) 2% (14,805) 
Ethiopia 
Sudan US Israel Djibouti Kenya 
25% (152,094) 23% (139,693) 14% (87,556) 6% (34,697) 5% (30,763) 
Kenya 
UK Tanzania US Uganda Canada 
33% (152,999) 20% (91,146) 19% (85,123) 9% (41,065) 6% (26,164) 
Madagascar 
France Comoros Canada Belgium US 
69% (54,841) 13% (10,401) 3% (2,363) 2% (1,608) 2% (1,496) 
Malawi 
Zimbabwe Tanzania UK Other South South Africa 
46% (98,270) 10% (21,042) 10% (20,816) 9% (20,158) 8% (17,955) 
Mauritius 
UK France Australia Italy Canada 
30% (41,632) 28% (39,958) 16% (22,914) 9% (12,022) 8% (11,240) 
Mozambique 
South Africa Malawi Zimbabwe Tanzania Other South 
39% (454,548) 14% (159,945) 13% (158,722) 12% (142,615) 10% (113,721) 
Rwanda 
Uganda Tanzania Burundi Other South Belgium 
47% (123,860) 19% (49,536) 13% (33,540) 10% (25,060) 4% (11,498) 
Seychelles 
UK Australia Canada Italy US 
31% (3,848) 26% (3,153) 8% (1,030) 7% (850) 7% (841) 
Somalia 
Ethiopia UK US Yemen  Djibouti 
20% (161,179) 14% (110,326) 13% (109,618) 10% (79,466) 7% (57,246) 
Sudan 
Saudi Arabia Uganda Yemen  Kenya Other South 
29% (279,409) 20% (191,103) 13% (126,109) 8% (73,076) 6% (56,913) 
Tanzania 
Kenya Uganda UK Other South Canada 
29% (92,527) 23% (71,833) 11% (34,347) 8% (25,510) 7% (23,009) 
Uganda 
Kenya Other South UK Tanzania US 
70% (531,218) 9% (70,733) 7% (54,122) 4% (30,110) 3% (22,460) 
Zambia 
Tanzania UK Zimbabwe Malawi Other Source 
23% (42,311) 18% (33,306) 15% (28,274) 12% (23,192) 7% (13,940) 
Zimbabwe 
South Africa UK Other South Mozambique Australia 
68% (858,993) 9% (115,530) 9% (114,968) 4% (49,280) 2% (25,963) 
World Bank Estimates. Percentage is percent of total migrants, number of migrants in parentheses; 
African destination countries bolded. “Other South” refers to unspecified destinations in Global 
South. 
Source: World Bank 2013a 
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TABLE A3.C NORTHERN AFRICA, TOP FIVE EMIGRATION DESTINATIONS, 2010 
Country Top Destination Destination 2 Destination 3 Destination 4 Destination 5 
Algeria 
France Spain Israel Canada Italy 
75% (913,794) 5% (63,346) 4% (47,199) 3% (37,543) 2% (29,480) 
Egypt  
Saudi Arabia Jordan Libya Kuwait Other South 
27% (1,005,873) 23% (851,803) 11% (397,064) 9% (319,483) 5% (176,077) 
Libya 
Israel UK Chad US Jordan 
26% (28,541) 11% (12,108) 10% (11,105) 10% (10,754) 7% (8,011) 
Morocco 
France Spain Italy Israel Belgium 
28% (840,985) 26% (778,451) 16% (475,783) 8% (245,574) 6% (172,682) 
Tunisia 
France Italy Libya Germany Israel 
46% (302,363) 19% (121,708) 13% (84,585) 6% (37,049) 2% (14,789) 
World Bank Estimates. Percentage is percent of total migrants, number of migrants in parentheses; 
African destination countries bolded. “Other South” refers to unspecified destinations in Global 
South. 
Source: World Bank 2013a 
 
     
TABLE A3.D SOUTHERN AFRICA, TOP FIVE EMIGRATION DESTINATIONS, 2010 
Country Top Destination Destination 2 Destination 3 Destination 4 Destination 5 
Botswana 
South Africa Other South Zimbabwe Namibia UK 
66% (41,846) 10% (6,006) 7% (4,244) 4% (2,741) 4% (2,717) 
Lesotho 
South Africa Other South Mozambique Tanzania UK 
82% (350,657) 11% (46,016) 7% (28,799) 0% (649) 0% (438) 
Namibia 
Mozambique Tanzania UK US Other South 
42% (6,909) 11% (1,891) 10% (1,629) 7% (1,205) 7% (1,099) 
South Africa 
UK Mozambique Australia US Canada 
26% (225,856) 18% (154,579) 15% (132,756) 9% (81,142) 5% (47,470) 
Swaziland 
South Africa Other South Mozambique UK US 
85% (135,720) 11% (16,974) 3% (4,118) 1% (1,143) 0% (766) 
World Bank Estimates. Percentage is percent of total migrants, number of migrants in parentheses; 
African destination countries bolded. “Other South” refers to unspecified destinations in Global 
South. 
Source: World Bank 2013a 
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TABLE A3.E WESTERN AFRICA, TOP FIVE EMIGRATION DESTINATIONS, 2010 
Country Top Destination Destination 2 Destination 3 Destination 4 Destination 5 
Benin 
Nigeria Togo Côte d'Ivoire Other South Gabon 
45% (238,561) 14% (74,336) 12% (62,371) 10% (54,669) 6% (32,173) 
Burkina Faso 
Côte d'Ivoire Other South Niger Mali Italy 
83% (1,310,892) 11% (167,834) 2% (29,881) 1% (22,365) 1% (11,651) 
Cape Verde 
Portugal France US Mozambique Angola 
33% (63,403) 12% (23,197) 11% (20,855) 11% (20,702) 7% (13,219) 
Congo  
Tanzania France Gabon Other South US 
31% (64,849) 30% (63,423) 7% (14,913) 5% (11,242) 3% (6,150) 
Gambia 
Spain US Nigeria Senegal UK 
28% (18,112) 12% (7,472) 10% (6,509) 9% (5,881) 8% (5,198) 
Ghana 
Nigeria Côte d'Ivoire US UK Burkina Faso 
23% (186,015) 13% (111,001) 13% (110,931) 12% (96,795) 6% (50,217) 
Guinea 
Côte d'Ivoire Senegal Sierra Leone Gambia Other South 
25% (134,171) 15% (80,773) 13% (69,127) 11% (58,625) 10% (51,552) 
Guinea-Bissau 
Portugal Senegal Gambia France Spain 
27% (30,225) 22% (24,155) 18% (20,158) 8% (8,653) 7% (7,462) 
Liberia 
Guinea Côte d'Ivoire US Other South Sierra Leone 
44% (189,437) 17% (74,734) 15% (66,652) 9% (37,453) 6% (24,887) 
Mali 
Côte d'Ivoire Nigeria Other South Niger France 
43% (440,960) 13% (133,464) 10% (98,799) 7% (69,790) 7% (68,786) 
Mauritania 
Senegal Nigeria Côte d'Ivoire France Spain 
25% (29,600) 15% (17,960) 13% (15,604) 12% (14,481) 9% (10,888) 
Niger 
Nigeria Côte d'Ivoire Benin Other South Chad 
23% (87,529) 22% (84,705) 21% (80,789) 11% (40,831) 10% (38,468) 
Nigeria 
US UK Chad Cameroon Italy 
21% (210,647) 15% (150,918) 11% (114,025) 8% (78,292) 5% (52,845) 
Senegal 
Gambia France Italy Mauritania Spain 
28% (177,306) 14% (91,446) 13% (81,424) 10% (64,557) 8% (51,672) 
Sierra Leone 
Guinea UK Other South US Liberia 
59% (157,067) 9% (22,898) 8% (21,659) 7% (17,549) 5% (12,086) 
Togo 
Nigeria Côte d'Ivoire Benin Other South Burkina Faso 
31% (115,791) 15% (56,527) 14% (51,302) 9% (33,991) 7% (23,993) 
World Bank Estimates. Percentage is percent of total migrants, number of migrants in parentheses; 
African destination countries bolded. “Other South” refers to unspecified destinations in Global South. 
Source: World Bank 2013a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
Development from Abroad? 
 
85 
Chapter 3: Appendix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE A3.F WESTERN UNION AND MONEYGRAM OUTLETS, 2013 
COUNTRY WESTERN UNION MONEYGRAM TOTAL 
ALGERIA 780 88 868 
ANGOLA 295 324 619 
BENIN 701 147 848 
BOTSWANA 111 20 131 
BURKINA FASO 550 261 811 
BURUNDI 25 5 30 
CAMEROON 1054 6 1060 
CAPE VERDE 110 35 1008 
C.A.R. 37 32 69 
CHAD 16 36 52 
COMOROS 50 23 73 
CONGO 52 63 115 
COTE D'IVOIRE 925 423 1348 
D.R.C. 180 129 309 
DJIBOUTI 16 2 18 
EGYPT 199 201 400 
EQ. GUINEA 12 0 12 
ERITREA 14 8 22 
ETHIOPIA 1648 1560 3208 
GABON 115 36 151 
GAMBIA 437 209 646 
GHANA 1825 1579 3404 
GUINEA 63 87 150 
GUINEA-BISSAU 35 12 47 
KENYA 1367 1007 2374 
LESOTHO 2 10 12 
LIBERIA 108 88 196 
LIBYA 321 121 442 
MADAGASCAR 195 45 240 
MALAWI 124 299 423 
MALI 300 363 663 
MAURITANIA 128 22 150 
MAURITIUS 44 89 133 
MOROCCO 7063 5714 12777 
MOZAMBIQUE 90 28 118 
NAMIBIA 4 25 29 
NIGER 80 25 105 
NIGERIA 5033 3702 8735 
RWANDA 304 105 409 
SAO T. & P. 8 4 12 
SENEGAL 1600 1300 2900 
SEYCHELLES 4 7   11 
SIERRA LEONE 97 97 194 
SOMALIA 4 0 4 
SOUTH AFRICA 639 975 1614 
SOUTH SUDAN 25 4 29 
SUDAN 59 0 59 
SWAZILAND 1 8 9 
TANZANIA 303 62 365 
TOGO 403 216 619 
TUNISIA 1810 525 2335 
UGANDA 500 322 822 
WESTERN SAHARA 27 40 67 
ZAMBIA 261 138 399 
ZIMBABWE 268 77 345 
TOTALS 30,422 20,704 51,989 
Sources: MoneyGram 2013; Western Union 2013. 
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TABLE A3.G REMITTANCES, 2010 (REPORTING COUNTRIES ONLY) 
Country Remittance Remittance (% of GNI) 
Algeria $66,000,000 0.0%  
Angola $17,972,037 0.0%  
Benin $127,108,663 2.0%  
Botswana $12,149,366 0.1%  
Burkina Faso* $84,004,980 1.0%  
Burundi $34,498,930 2.3%  
Cameroon $93,622,353 0.4%  
Cape Verde $130,420,622 8.4%  
Côte d’Ivoire $191,594,762 0.8%  
Djibouti $6,577,726 0.5%  
Egypt $12,453,100,000 5.7%  
Ethiopia $345,150,775 1.3%  
Gambia $107,314,553 11.4%  
Ghana $135,852,160 0.4%  
Guinea $44,840,000 1.2%  
Guinea-Bissau $43,910,779 5.4%  
Kenya $685,757,272 2.1%  
Lesotho $6,040,879 0.2%  
Liberia $213,908 0.0%  
Malawi $15,926,805 0.3%  
Mali $437,433,983 4.8%  
Morocco $6,422,542,514 6.9%  
Mozambique $33,415,350 0.4%  
Namibia $6,017,279 0.1%  
Niger* $60,334,238 1.1%  
Nigeria $19,650,650,848 10.9%  
Rwanda $98,207,379 1.8%  
Sao Tome & Principe $6,363,257 3.0%  
Senegal $1,384,122,360 11.0%  
Seychelles $16,488,951 1.8%  
Sierra Leone $41,568,561 2.1%  
Sudan $1,290,912,517 1.7%  
Swaziland $1,871,272 0.0%  
Tanzania $42,794,934 0.2%  
Togo $300,979,035 9.5%  
Tunisia $1,724,814,867 4.1%  
Uganda $768,000,000 4.6%  
Zambia $43,700,000 0.3%  
*Value from 2009 
Source: World Bank 2011. 
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TABLE A3.H GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE DIASPORA, 2013 
Country Year  Type Institution Title 
Algeria 2002 Subministry State Secretary of the National Community Living Abroad 
Angola 1992 Subministry The Institute Providing Support to Angolan Communities Abroad  
Benin 2009 Subministry The Subagency of the Directorate for Relations with Beninese Abroad 
Burkina Faso 2007 Subministry High Council of Burkinabe Abroad 
Burundi 2009 Subministry Directorate of the Diaspora 
Cameroon 2005 Subministry Division for Cameroonians Abroad 
Cape Verde 2001 Ministry Min. of Emigrant Communities‡  
Comoros 2005 Shared Ministry Min. of Foreign Relations, Cooperation, and Comorians Abroad 
Côte d’Ivoire 2001 Subministry Department of Ivoirians Abroad 
Dem. Congo 2006 Subministry Directorate of Congolese Nationals Abroad 
Eq. Guinea 2013 Subministry Directorate of the Diaspora 
Eritrea 2002 Subministry Department of Eritreans Abroad‡  
Ethiopia 2002 Subministry General Directorate in charge of Expatriate Affairs  
Gambia 2010 Shared Ministry Min. of Foreign Affairs, Int’l Cooperation, and Gambians Abroad 
Ghana 2006 Shared Ministry Min. of Tourism and Diaspora Relations  
Guinea 2009 Ministry Min. of Guineans Abroad 
Guinea-Bissau 2006 Shared Ministry Min. of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation, and the Diaspora  
Kenya 2007 Subministry International Jobs and Diaspora Office 
Malawi 2011 Other Office Diaspora Affairs Unit  
Mali 2000 Shared Ministry Min. of Malians Abroad and African Integration  
Mauritania 2008 Ministry State Secretariat of Mauritanians Abroad 
Morocco 1990 Ministry Min. in Charge of Moroccans Living Abroad 
Mozambique 2009 Subministry National Institute for Mozambican Communities Abroad 
Niger 2009 Shared Ministry Min. of Foreign Affairs, Cooperation, African Integration, Nigeriens Abroad 
Nigeria 2001 Subministry Nigerians in the Diaspora Organization 
Rwanda 2001 Subministry Diaspora General Directorate  
Sao T & P 2005 Shared Ministry Min. of Foreign Affairs, Cooperation & Communities  
Senegal 2003 Ministry Min. of Senegalese Abroad  
Sierra Leone 2007 Other Office Office of the Diaspora 
Somalia 2009 Shared Ministry Min. for Diaspora and Community Affairs  
South Sudan 2011 Subministry Liaison Offices and Diaspora  
Tanzania 2010 Subministry Diaspora Engagement and Opportunities Department  
Togo 2011 Subministry Department of Togolese Abroad  
Tunisia 1988 Shared Ministry Min. of Social Affairs, Solidarity and Tunisians Abroad‡  
Uganda 2010 Subministry Diaspora Services Department  
Zambia 2009 Other Office Diaspora Desk  
Notes: All subministries are located within countries’ foreign affairs ministries; All “other offices” are housed directly or 
indirectly under the office of the president. 
‡ Cape Verde previously established a subministry in 2001, replaced by the full ministry in 2010; The Department of Eritreans 
Abroad was called the Commission for Eritreans Residing Abroad from 2002 – 2007; Tunisia created the Office of Tunisians 
Abroad in the Ministry of Social Affairs in 1988, and renamed the Ministry in 2005. 
Sources: Various electronic country sources. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
The continent of Africa is home to the largest concentration of developing 
countries in the world. Of the 49 countries the UN classifies as “least developed”, 
two-thirds (34) of them are located in Africa1, including the UN’s newest member, 
South Sudan (UN-OHRLLS 2011). The least developed countries (LDCs) are 
classified as such according to their low incomes but also for a lack of economic 
stability and diversity as well as a number of other factors:  poor education and 
health rates, and a lack of food and environmental security relative to other 
countries. In contrast to the 34 LDCs there, other African states have made 
development strides over the last few decades, including South Africa, Botswana, 
Ghana, the island nations of the Seychelles and Mauritius, and the five Northern 
African countries bordering the Mediterranean (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and 
Tunisia). This chapter examines the impacts of transnational remittances and the 
institutionalization of diaspora engagement on development in Africa through 
quantitative analysis. 
The following section describes and compares three development indicators 
across Africa - education, health, and income – both regionally and nationally, and 
explains the calculation of a development index (much like the Human Development 
Index (HDI) from the UNDP), for use as the dependent variable. Section Three 
describes the other variables as well as the methodological approach for the 
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analysis in Section Four. To investigate the connections between both transnational 
remittances and new governmental institutions of the diaspora with development in 
Africa, I quantitatively model the relationships using panel regression. Using 
available data, 43 of the 53 (now 54) countries are in the model that considers 
development from 1990 through 2010.  The final section summarizes.  
DEVELOPMENT  
It has been conventional for many scholars and international organizations 
to separate Africa into two main regions: North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. North 
African states are generally grouped with the developing states in the Middle East 
(the MENA region). Generally, the five states of the Afro-Mediterranean surpass the 
much larger group of 48 (now 49) sub-Saharan states on many development 
indicators and have for decades. Yet southern states like South Africa and Namibia 
along with the island states of Mauritius and Seychelles outperform the non-petrol 
states of Central and West Africa. Figure 4.1 compares the two regions across three 
common development indicators from 1980 through 2010. As a measure of income, 
I use gross national product per capita, purchasing power parity (GNPppp) from the 
Penn World Tables (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2012).2 With a GNPppp per capita 
of just under $7000 in 2010, North Africa median income is five times that of sub-
Saharan Africa (just under $1400). Indeed, sub-Saharan income for 2010 is roughly 
equal to that of North Africa 30 years earlier in 1980. The same trend exists with 
respect to average expected education and longevity. At nine years in 2010, the 
median expected years of schooling for sub-Saharan children has been growing at 
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slower rates and is approximately equal to that from 25 years ago in North Africa.  
Life expectancy in sub-Saharan Africa (55 years in 2010) is among the lowest in the 
world and has yet to reach 59 years, the median life expectancy in North African in 
1980.  
FIGURE 4.1 REGIONAL COMPARISONS: NORTH AND SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The differences between Northern Africa and “the rest” are much less stark 
when the sub-Saharan regions are considered separately as Central, Eastern, 
Southern, and Western Africa. Figure 4.2 compares Africa’s five regions on the same 
indicators as above. Median Southern African income has paralleled that of 
Northern Africa for the last 30 years and was slightly higher for most of the 1990s. 
Contributing mostly to this trend are the diamond industry in Botswana and overall 
growth in South Africa, one of the five “BRICS” countries commonly identified as the 
world’s most promising emerging economies.3 Increasing oil revenues in Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon, and Angola since the 1990s have slightly set Central African income 
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apart from the two poorest regions, East and West Africa. However, these two 
regions, along with North Africa have most steadily grown education rates since the 
1990s. North Africans have maintained much longer life expectancies – 10 or more 
years on average – than most of their southern counterparts. Though Southern 
African life expectancy paralleled that of Northern Africa before the 1990s, the 
disproportionate impact of HIV/Aids in Southern Africa – where prevalence rates 
remain the highest in the world – played a major role in lowering life expectancies 
throughout the 1990s until around 2005 when they leveled off at 50 years and 
began to increase. A more coherent analysis of African development is possible 
when all the regions are surveyed. In focusing on the development impacts of 
remittances and of institutionalizing diaspora engagement, I include countries from 
all of Africa’s five regions.  
FIGURE 4.2 REGIONAL COMPARISON: AFRICA’S FIVE REGIONS4 
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Just as disaggregating sub-Saharan Africa into geo-economic regions 
illuminates more diversity across the four regions and some similarities to Northern 
Africa, inspecting the development indicators by country exposes even more 
diversity and allows further comparison. The first component of the development 
index is education. Education is a crucial asset in driving development as it 
increases citizens’ capabilities and expands socioeconomic opportunities. Figure 4.3 
shows the expected years of schooling by country from 1980 through 2010. For 
comparison, and to provide examples of countries at various stages of development, 
I have included three other countries: Brazil, France, and Haiti. The three represent 
a BRICS country, an OECD country, and an LDC.  
As Figure 4.3 indicates, the average expected years of schooling in Africa as a 
whole increased from six to nine years from 1980 to 2010. Many of the 53 countries 
included here have made at least modest improvements in children’s education 
rates.5 By 2010, the countries of North Africa along with Botswana, South Africa, and 
the small island states of Mauritius and the Seychelles were on par with Brazil and 
France at well over 10 years of expected schooling. On the other hand, for example, 
a decade of intermittent civil war in Congo in the 1990s saw expected schooling fall 
from 13 years in 1980 to eight years in 2000. Still many states, especially in East 
Africa, have education rates below those in Haiti, the poorest country in the Western 
Hemisphere. 
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FIGURE 4.3 EXPECTED YEARS OF SCHOOLING FOR CHILDREN, 1980 – 2010  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The second component of the development index is life expectancy at birth, 
an indicator of the overall health of a state’s citizenry. Like education, good health is 
important for development in that it expands peoples’ capabilities. Higher life 
expectancies also generally reflect competent public health sectors and citizens’ 
increased knowledge of health risks. Figure 4.4 shows life expectancies by country. 
Average life expectancy for Africans has grown from 50 years in 1980 to 57 years in 
2010 and most individual countries have seen increases of five or more years. In 
2010, life expectancies ranged from 47 to 75 years in Sierra Leone and Libya 
Quantitative Analysis 
94 
Combs 
respectively. Wars and other political violence have held down or decreased life 
expectancies in, for example, Congo, Liberia, and Rwanda. As noted above, the AIDS 
crisis beginning in the late 1980s has been one significant factor in decreasing life 
expectancies, especially in Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe. In 2010, 
17 countries including Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Côte d’Ivoire, and Sierra Leone had life 
expectancies more than 10 years less than that of Haiti, 62 years. In the same year, 
eight countries had life expectancies equal to or slightly higher than Brazil at 73 
years, including Cape Verde, Morocco, and Tunisia. 
FIGURE 4.4 LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH, 1980 – 2010 
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The final component of the development index is per capita income. 
Increases to income are important for development in that they expand citizens’ 
capabilities, opportunities, and choices. Table 4.A shows the 10 largest and 10 
smallest per capita incomes in Africa (Table A4.B in the chapter’s appendix shows 
the full list of countries and their incomes).  Measured in the same international 
dollar, two states’ per capita incomes were lower in 2010 than in 1980: Liberia and 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. The latter is the poorest country on the 
continent, and in 2010 its income of $263 was less than one percent of the highest, 
Seychelles, and just over one percent of the second highest income, Libya.  
TABLE 4.A HIGHEST AND LOWEST INCOME COUNTRIES PER CAPITA, 1980 – 2010 
 
GNPppp pc Average Annual Growth 
10 Highest-Income  1980 2010 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Seychelles $6,265 $32,322 8% 5% 5% 
Libya $9,641* $20,227 -4% 2% 9% 
Gabon $7,130 $13,005 1% 0% 8% 
Mauritius $1,482 $10,515 11% 6% 4% 
Botswana $1,484 $10,285 13% 5% 4% 
South Africa $3,016 $8,730 2% 3% 6% 
Equatorial Guinea $376 $7,165 -2% 32% 17% 
Tunisia $1,825 $7,147 4% 4% 6% 
Algeria $2,694 $6,933 2% 2% 6% 
Namibia $1,984 $5,831 4% 2% 6% 
10 Lowest-Income  
     Madagascar $534 $807 1% 1% 2% 
Malawi $369 $791 1% 1% 7% 
Eritrea $602* $699 n/a 3% 0% 
Central African Republic $329 $674 4% 2% 3% 
Niger $428 $549 0% 0% 2% 
Somalia $311 $487 4% -2% 3% 
Burundi $253 $452 5% -2% 3% 
Liberia $656 $404 -6% 10% 0% 
Zimbabwe $195 $359 5% -1% 3% 
Democratic Congo $302 $263 0% -5% 5% 
*First column data for Libya and Eritrea are from 1985 and 1992 respectively 
Source: Heston, Summers, and Aten 2012 (Penn World Tables) 
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Focusing on the top income countries, revenues from extensive oil reserves 
drive income upward in Libya, Algeria, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea while 
Botswana is the world’s largest diamond producer (BBC 2012).  The Seychelles 
relies on tourism for one-quarter of its income and 70 percent of its foreign 
exchange earnings (World Bank 2012). Tourism, along with an expansive 
international banking sector, also drives much economic success in Mauritius. Less 
dependent on one commodity or sector, Tunisia, South Africa, and Namibia (whose 
economy remains closely linked to South Africa’s) have relatively more diversified 
economies with large manufacturing, retail, and finance sectors (African Economic 
Outlook 2013). Most of these countries have enjoyed more than adequate growth 
rates over the last three decades: the economy of the Seychelles is now over five 
times as large as it was in 1980 and that of Equatorial Guinea, thanks to the 
expansion of its oil infrastructure and exports throughout the 1990s, is now over 19 
times larger than in 1980. However, this accelerated growth has not come without 
costs: rising inflation, corruption, and inequality (World Bank 2013b; Transparency 
International 2012). Furthermore, education rates in Equatorial Guinea have fallen 
since 1990 (Figure 4.3).  
Most of the lower income countries on the continent have clearly not 
experienced sustained economic growth over the last few decades, though many 
have experienced political instability along with prolonged or episodic violence. 
This is not to say that higher income countries have been immune from violence and 
political instability: for example, after a military coup that halted elections in 1991, 
oil-rich Algeria spent a decade in civil war with 150,000 casualties (Uppsala Conflict 
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Data Program 2011; BBC 2013). In 2010, Chad ranked twenty-sixth and Sudan 
eighteenth in income out of the 53 African states and ranked third and second 
respectively out of 168 states on the Failed States Index (FSI) (Table A4.B; Fund for 
Peace 2013). The FSI combines social, economic, and political indicators to measure 
the ability of governments to provide public goods and hold a legitimate monopoly 
over the use of violence. Higher ranks indicate less ability or inability to do so. In the 
same year, the first, fourth, and fifth states on the FSI were Somalia, Zimbabwe, and 
Democratic Congo, three of Africa’s poorest countries. Revenues from and foreign 
investment in oil reserves set Chad and Sudan apart from the lowest income 
countries economically, yet both of these countries score low on most social 
indicators, including education and health (Figures 4.3 and 4.4). Examples such as 
these signify the necessity of measuring development through multiple indicators 
rather than solely using income.   
Accordingly, I construct an index which factors in education, health, and 
income similar to the HDI used by the UNDP. The UNDP’s HDI has three sub-indices. 
The first of these is the education index, which uses the expected years of schooling 
for children along with the mean actual years of schooling for adults. The health 
index uses life expectancy at birth and the income index uses GNIppp per capita. 
Due to a lack of available data for many African country-years for the mean years of 
schooling for adults and GNIppp per capita, I use only the expected years of 
schooling for children to build the education index, and GNPppp per capita for the 
income index.6 In the end, for the country-years for which both are available, my 
index is correlated with actual HDI at 0.972. 
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Creating the development index consists of two steps: calculating each sub-
index and compiling the final values. The sub-indices are normalized by benchmark 
minimum and maximum values observed or set by the UNDP for their respective 
indicators to obtain relative values for each category. For example, the difference in 
life expectancy for country i and the minimum benchmark life expectancy (20 years) 
is divided by the global range of life expectancy (83.2 years from Japan, 2010 minus 
the 20 year minimum) to produce the health index (Equation 1). After each sub-
index is obtained, they are combined by finding the geometric mean of all three 
(Equation 2). Following the UNDP when measuring income, the natural logarithm of 
income is used rather than the actual value (UNDP 2010). The extreme values for 
each sub-index are shown in Table A4.C. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5 shows the development rankings of countries in 2010 (Figure A4.1 
in the appendix shows all years). Values span practically the entire range of the 
index from the war-torn societies of Somalia and Democratic Congo to the better-off 
states of the Seychelles and Libya. Using this index, the four most developed African 
countries (Libya, Seychelles, Mauritius, and Tunisia) fall between France and Brazil. 
About half of the countries in Africa fall below Haiti, which is consistent with the 
HDI from the UNDP.  
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 FIGURE 4.5 DEVELOPMENT INDEX, 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Development in Africa is diverse. What Figure 4.5 and the development index 
in general show is that national development – in terms of increasing citizens’ social 
and economic capacities and opportunities – is multi-faceted and larger than income 
alone. While the top 10 to 15 African countries in Figure 4.5 have made 
development strides across all three indicators – health, education, and income – the 
remainder continue to struggle to improve on one or more of the key development 
aspects. For example Madagascar, though vulnerable to environmental shocks and 
political instability which repeatedly render its economy stagnant and growth 
fragile, made progress in providing education and health care in the 2000s. In 
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contrast, Zambia enjoyed 10 percent average annual economic growth throughout 
the 2000s (Table A4.B), and while expected years of schooling for Zambian children 
was an admirable eight years in 2010, this figure had not increased in 30 years and 
remained below the continental average (Figure 4.3). Life expectancy in Zambia – 
like most Southern African nations – plummeted in the 1990s due to the AIDS crisis 
and was still below 50 years in 2010 (Figure 4.4). As these two examples suggest – 
and though economic growth can have a positive impact on education and health 
rates – increases to income are neither a necessary nor sufficient circumstance for 
improving the social condition. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Rather than to isolate one or another aspect of development, I use the 
development index as the outcome in the hypotheses herein tests for more holistic 
development impacts from transnational remittances and government diaspora 
institutions. As explained in Chapter One, I test two main hypotheses. Hypothesis 
One states that as the ratio of remittances to gross national income increases to a 
critical value, states will experience higher growth rates in human development; 
after the critical value, states will experience lower growth rates in human 
development. I purposefully employ the quadratic form of remittances (as a ratio to 
GNI). I expect that small amounts of remittances in relation to income will be 
healthy for development, while states that receive a more sizeable percentage of 
income from remittances will be prone to suffering from brain-drain or the loss of 
relatively large portions of the potential labor force. Thus, any potentially positive 
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effects of small amounts of remittances with respect to income will be reversed as 
remittances garner a larger percentage of income. Hypothesis Two holds that states 
with a national-level formal institution of the diaspora will experience higher 
growth rates in human development. The second hypothesis posits a positive 
relationship, holding that if governments at least attempt to engage members of the 
diaspora they may be inspired to contribute not just with economic but also social 
and intellectual remittances, or to join hometown associations with other diasporic 
members. 
I model these relationships with a variation of two-stage least squares fixed 
effects regression of a panel dataset with five waves of five-year averages from 1990 
through 2010 on 43 African countries for which data are available for at least two 
time periods (countries included are listed in the appendix, Table A4.D). There 
exists the potential for endogeneity and reverse causality between remittances and 
development, that is to say that more developed countries will receive more 
remittances since their emigrants are on average more educated and skilled than 
those from less developed countries. Following a method endorsed by the IMF 
(Barajas et al. 2009; Chami et al. 2009; Chami et al. 2008), I use instrumental 
variable techniques to predict remittances for each individual year reported and 
then use the average of the fitted values as the average remittance in a final 
regression, employing the ratio of remittances to income in all other (remittance-
reporting) African countries as the instrumental variable.7 To explain, for country i 
in year t, I divide the total remittances to all other African countries by the total of 
GNI to all those countries in year t. This gives the ratio of the rest of African 
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remittance reporting countries to use on the right-hand side of a two-way fixed 
effects regression from 1985 to 2009. Then I use the average of each five year 
period fitted values (1985-1989,…, 2005-2009) in the final equation.  
The requirements of a valid instrumental variable are (1) that it be highly 
correlated with the endogenous regressor and (2) that it not be correlated with the 
dependent variable and only affect the dependent variable through its effects on the 
endogenous regressor (Wooldridge 2002). Remittance trends to other African 
countries capture some of the transaction costs for emigrants associated with 
remitting as well as decisions about whether and how much to remit. By omitting 
the country in question from the construction of the instrumental variable, the 
instrument remains exogenous and can only be related to development in that 
country through its impact on levels of remittance.   
I extend the same method for aid (official development assistance) used as a 
control variable, since aid is also endogenous to development: less developed 
countries should in theory get more aid and more developed countries less. The 
rationale for using aid to all other aid-receiving African countries (as a ratio to GNI) 
is to capture donor behavior and tendencies with respect to fluctuations in total 
donor budget allotments for African aid in a given year. Again here, aid dollars to 
other African countries can only impact development in the country in question 
through their impact on aid to that country (due to donor preferences, etc). The t-
scores for REMREST OF AFRICA  and AID REST OF AFRICA  in the first-stage regressions are -
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10.35 and -24.98 respectively, both of which are adequately large to support their 
validity (Schmidheiny 2012) (results in appendix, Table A4.E).  
Next, for the dependent variable in the final equation, I use a deviation-from-
fit measure. Much like income, where one would expect richer countries to grow 
more slowly or increase less annually than poorer economies, countries whose 
development index is relatively low have further to grow than those toward the top 
of the scale. The UNDP often uses deviation-from-fit to measure the progress of 
developing countries (Gidwitz et al. 2010; Klugman et al. 2011; Molina and Purser 
2010). To get the deviation-from-fit, I regress the change in the index on its initial 
value using the natural logarithms of each in a fixed effects regression. The residuals 
of this growth model are the differences (like in any regression) of the actual and 
expected values of the change (dependent variable) given the starting point (results 
in appendix, Table A4.E). I use the residuals from this equation as a measure of 
relative development: it is relative to a) its starting point five years ago and b) to 
other countries starting at similar values. This accounts for the relative gains one 
would expect and does not punish more developed countries for smaller changes. It 
also helps avoid multicollinearity issues in the alternative, where including a lagged 
value of the index on the right-hand side of the final equation is correlated with 
control variables.  
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FIGURE 4.6 DEVIATION-FROM-FIT RESULTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6 shows the distribution of the deviation-from-fit measure by time 
period in a series of box plots. Box plots are useful to display distributions since they 
give viewers a sense of the dispersion and identify outlying values. In each of the 
five box plots in Figure 4.6, the bold horizontal lines inside the boxes represent the 
median values for each time period, the boxes encompass the first through third 
quartiles, the whiskers denote relatively extreme values, and individual points 
identify outliers.  For the deviation-from-fit measure of development, while most 
country-years are centered around zero – indicating relatively small residuals – the 
outlying values can mostly be traced back to various periods of drastic policy 
changes or political instability for the countries shown. For instance, after allegedly 
fraudulent elections and a subsequent military coup in Nigeria in 1983-4, incomes 
Development from Abroad? 
 
105 
Chapter 4 
wavered and education rates dropped from an expected 8.5 to 6.5 years of schooling 
for children, driving down its development index (Banks, Miller, and Overstreet 
2007: 679-680). The introduction of free primary education (FPE) in Malawi in 
1994 saw an increase of one million pupils in 1995 and more than doubled the 
expected years of schooling from five to over 10, and Burundi saw similar results 
after introducing FPE in 2005 (Chimombo 2005; UNDP 2011). The 1994 genocide in 
Rwanda saw all the components of its development index plummet from 1990 to 
1995 and then quickly recuperate by 2000. Government and economic reforms in 
Ethiopia over the last decade have resulted in increases to all its development index 
components, most markedly from 2005 to 2010 (World Bank 2013). Finally, HIV 
prevalence in Lesotho surged upward 71 percent from 1995 to 2000 (from 14 to 25 
percent) and life expectancy fell from 57 to 48 years during that period (UNAIDS 
2012; UNDP 2011).  
 Using this deviation-from-fit measure as the dependent variable, the 
quantitative model contains six control variables that may affect development. 
Expectations are that two of these, war/violent conflict and HIV prevalence, will 
have negative impacts on development. Aid, Freedom House rating, the political 
constraints index, and increasing economic openness will most likely show positive 
influences.  
First, to test the impacts of democratization on development, I use the 
Freedom House ratings. Freedom House indexes are created from expert surveys for 
all the world’s countries and rates each country as free, partially free, or not free in 
Quantitative Analysis 
106 
Combs 
terms of political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House 2011). Of the 53 African 
countries, over half (55 percent) were rated as not free in 1990, while in 2010 less 
than half (40 percent) received this rating (Figure 4.7). The number of full 
democracies (rated “free”) rose from four (Botswana, The Gambia, Mauritius, and 
Namibia) to eleven from 1990 to 2005 but then fell to nine by 2010, after Senegal 
and Lesotho moved from “free” to “partially free”. In Senegal, allegedly rigged 2007 
presidential elections and President Abdoulaye Wade’s subsequent postponement 
of many municipal and national legislative elections – which 12 parties eventually 
boycotted – saw its rating drop. In Lesotho, executive, legislative, and municipal 
election results were heavily disputed between 2006 and 2009. The opposition 
party supporters’ taking of hostages at the Independent Electoral Commission and 
an assassination attempt of Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili led to a lowering of 
the country’s former rating as a “free” democracy (Freedom House 2011).  
FIGURE 4.7 FREEDOM HOUSE SCORES FOR AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
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Second, as an indicator of the political economy climate, I use the Political 
Constraints Index III (Henisz 2013 [2000]). The expectation is that healthier 
political economies will experience greater development, since more constraints 
indicate a healthier political economy. This index measures the feasibility of policy 
change according to the distribution of veto power among branches of government, 
cross-branch party alignment as well as legislative fractionalization. The index 
theoretically goes from zero to one with higher values indicating less feasibility of 
policy change on the part of a single or a few actors. While it measures political 
checks and balances, economists often use it as a gauge of likelihood of investment 
in infrastructure or the overall health of the political economy. These scores in 
Figure 4.8 represent the average score for the five previous years by country. Over 
the last two decades, the median value of this index in Africa moved from zero to 
0.23. For reference, the highest scoring country in 2010 was Belgium (0.71) and the 
US scored 0.40 in 2010 (Henisz 2013 [2000]).  
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FIGURE 4.8 POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Third, as shown in the previous chapter, war and other types of political 
violence can halt or reverse development trajectories. I control for war and/or other 
political violence using the Uppsala Conflict Data Program database (Gleditsch et al.  
2002; Themnér and Wallensteen 2012). Figure 4.9 shows the number and 
percentage of countries that experienced one or more years of violence in the 
previous five years for each period in the sample. An average of 26 out of 53 
countries experienced no conflict each five-year period, while an average of two 
countries did so all five years of the period. Countries experiencing conflict for more 
than half of the 21 years in the sample include Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Chad, 
Democratic Congo, Liberia, Somalia, and Sudan.  
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FIGURE 4.9 WAR AND VIOLENCE IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fourth, as a measure of economic openness and liberalization, I use the 
change in trade openness over the previous five years for each period. These data 
are from the Penn World Tables and the raw measure is the ratio of trade (exports 
plus imports) to gross domestic product (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2012). Figure 
4.10 shows the ratio of this value to the value five years ago. The median change in 
trade with respect to income gradually increased from below one to almost 1.2 
(which would represent a 20 percent increase).  
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FIGURE 4.10 TRADE OPENNESS IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES  
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The next control variable is HIV prevalence. Figure 4.11 shows the 
distribution of HIV prevalence for each time period. Data on HIV prevalence first 
became widely available around 1990, at which time the highest prevalence was 
found in Zambia at 13 percent of adults. The median value rose from under one 
percent in 1990 to around 2.5 percent in 2010. All of the outliers for all time periods 
(save Malawi in 1990) are located in Southern Africa, illustrating the 
disproportionate impact of AIDS and HIV in the region, still one of the world’s 
regions most devastated by the disease. 
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FIGURE 4.11 HIV PREVALENCE IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
 
 
 
 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
 
I use the ratio of aid to income as the final control variable in the analysis. 
Figure 4.12 shows that the average amount of aid to African countries has remained 
around 10 percent of income for the last two decades, decreasing slightly in the 21st 
century. Notable outliers include war-torn Somalia, which received aid amounting 
to over half of its total income throughout the 1990s, and Liberia, which after the 
end of its protracted civil war and the adoption of structural adjustment programs 
in the late 2000s received aid almost equal to the total of its income, above 90 
percent. 
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FIGURE 4.12 OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (AID) TO AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.B shows the model diagnostics that directed me to the best fitting 
model to use.  First, a Hausman test checks for the presence of statistically 
significant fixed effects (Wooldridge 2002). In the context of the present model, the 
test looks for time-invariant country-specific idiosyncrasies uncaptured by the 
variables included in the model. The null hypothesis of no country-specific effects is 
rejected. As one would expect, the Hausman test results show the presence of 
statistically significant fixed effects, so these effects should be included in the 
model.8 The second and third tests address assumptions about the residuals in 
longitudinal models. The Breusch-Pagan test has as its null hypothesis 
homoskedasticity or constant variance of the residuals. If the errors do not have a 
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constant variance (called heteroskedasticity) the standard errors of the coefficients 
may be biased downward, which could lead analysts to wrongly assign statistical 
significance to the coefficients (Wooldridge 2002).9  For the present model, the 
Breusch-Pagan test does not reject the null hypothesis so heteroskedasticity is not 
an issue. However, the Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge test for serial correlation in 
the residuals indicates that they are correlated across time within countries. This 
means that, for a given country, the best predictor for the value of its residual at 
time t is the value of its residual in the previous time period (time = t-1). When this 
correlation exists across time within countries, coefficient estimates are statistically 
inefficient (Wooldridge 2002). The null hypothesis for this test posits no serial 
correlation and here is rejected, and addressed with a variance covariance matrix 
robust to serial correlation to make the estimates more efficient.  
TABLE 4.B MODEL DIAGNOSTICS 
Test Ho Statistics Result: Ho  
Hausman  Random over Fixed effects 
X2(8) = 100.17 
p = 0.000 
Rejected 
Breusch-Pagan  Homoskedasticity 
X2(10) = 14.02 
p = 0.172 
Not rejected 
Breusch-
Godfrey/Wooldridge 
No Serial Correlation 
X2(2) = 19.22 
p = 0.000 
Rejected 
LaGrange Multiplier Significant Time-fixed effects 
F(4, 148) = 0.57 
p = 0.687 
Not rejected 
Pesaran 
No Cross-sectional 
dependence 
Z = 1.35 
p = 0.177 
Not 
rejected* 
*Pesaran test performed on more balanced sub-sample of data, 25 countries, 4-5 time periods (77% of 
observations). 
 
Next, the effects of time are significant according to the Lagrange Multiplier 
test. This is a simple hypothesis test for significant differences across time periods. 
In the present context, testing the statistical significance of time fixed effects 
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addresses the question: “were development strides on average between 2005 and 
2010, for example, different from those between 1990 and 1995 for African 
countries?” Many African and Africanist scholars and policymakers would expect 
differences across the 1990s and 2000s due to changes on the continent and 
beyond. Though not exhaustive, this list includes:  democratization efforts, economic 
liberalization, and educational reforms domestically; increased participation in 
regional economic organizations and the quick rise and relatively slower fall (in 
most regions) of HIV prevalence rates; and international processes of political and 
economic globalization. Supporting this idea, the null hypothesis of statistically 
significant time-fixed effects is not rejected in the Lagrange Multiplier test, and time-
fixed effects are included in the model.  
Finally, the Pesaran test of cross-sectional dependence posits its null 
hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence (Wooldridge 2002). The presence of 
cross-sectional dependence would indicate that the residuals were correlated 
within time periods across countries, or for example, that significant events 
between 1995 and 2000 caused residuals across many countries that were 
significantly lower or higher than for other time periods, i.e., particularly 
widespread natural disasters or conflicts, or sweeping (and effective) continental or 
multi-country development policy changes. While the inclusion of time-fixed effects 
helps to avoid cross-sectional dependence, the null hypothesis of the Pesaran test is 
not rejected, so it is not necessary to address this issue in the model.10  
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RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
FIGURE 4.13 MODEL RESULTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.13 shows the results of the second-stage fixed effects panel 
regression on the deviation-from-fit measure. These results are compared to the 
results of the non-instrumented model in the appendix (Table A4.F), and the model 
fit statistics (adjusted R-squared and F-test) are slightly better for the instrumented 
model supporting the validity of the instruments. The first research hypothesis is 
supported, in that small amounts of remittance are associated with positive 
development and larger amounts are negatively so. The second research hypothesis 
is not supported. No significant development differences are found between 
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countries with a governmental diaspora institution and those without for the two 
decades in the model.  
In Figure 4.13, the estimated coefficients are shown as points with 95 
percent confidence intervals represented by the horizontal lines. Those lines that do 
not cross zero indicate statistically significant effects in the model. Starting at the 
bottom one can see that the effects for violent conflict and HIV prevalence are 
negative and significant as one would expect. Violence is measured as the 
proportion of the previous five years in which war or conflict took place and this 
takes values from 0 to 1. The coefficient here of 0.09 reflects the nine percent 
decrease (since the dependent variable is in log form) in expected development 
when a country spends all five previous years in conflict rather than having five 
conflict-free years. This means that countries like Burundi in 2005 or Chad in 1990 
or 1995 that experienced conflict for all five previous years could have increased 
development by almost 10 percent by having a peaceful five years all else equal. 
Also negative and statistically significant, the coefficient for HIV prevalence is -
0.015, meaning that a one percent increase in HIV prevalence predicts a one-and-a-
half percent decrease in relative development all else equal. Consider Lesotho, the 
country that saw the biggest increase in HIV prevalence in the sample: the rate 
moved from 14.3 percent in 1995 to 24.3 percent in 2000, an increase of 71 percent. 
All else equal, had the rate of HIV prevalence in the small kingdom not increased at 
all, the model predicts that Lesotho could have experienced double its observed 
development progress (71 percent increase times -0.015 yields a -106.5 percent 
decrease).11 
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The effects of the diaspora ministries, a “partially free” Freedom House 
rating, and change in trade openness are not significant. However, a “free” rating 
from Freedom House is positive and significant with a coefficient of 0.05.12 Since the 
“not free” rating is the base category for this categorical variable, countries rated 
“free” have relative development scores (deviations-from-fit) that are five percent 
higher than countries rated “not free”, ceteris paribus. This means that in 2010 
nondemocratic countries like Tunisia and Guinea rated “not free” were predicted to 
develop five percent more each time period had they been democracies, all else 
equal.  
The impacts of aid are also positive and significant, and the coefficient is 0.05. 
Since both this variable and the dependent variable are measured in log form, this 
estimate means that a one percent increase in aid (with respect to income) predicts 
a 0.05 percent increase in relative development all else equal. For example, if 
Ghana’s 2000 aid to income percentage were 10 percent (the average) rather than 
the observed eight percent, all else equal this difference (a 25 percent increase) 
would predict a 1.25 percent increase in Ghana’s relative development.13 While a 
1.25 percent increase is admittedly slight, the model’s positive and statistically 
significant result for aid does indicate that well-placed aid can be a positive force for 
development.  
Finally, Figure 4.13 shows three values for the coefficient for remittance 
representing the 15th, 50th, and 85th percentile of observed remittance to income 
ratios. Since the quadratic form of this variable is in the model, the effect changes 
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dependent upon its value. These results show that small amounts of remittance are 
positive and statistically significant, middle-range values are not significant, and 
values toward the higher end are negative and significant, as further explained 
below.   
FIGURE 4.14 THE IMPACTS OF REMITTANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4.14 shows the distribution of remittances in the shaded histogram. 
The values for the coefficient of remittances are superimposed along with 95 
percent confidence intervals. The estimated coefficients for the level and quadratic 
forms are -0.096 and -0.010 respectively. To find the exact turning point (when the 
effect changes from positive to negative), it is necessary to find the first derivative of 
-0.096x + -0.010x2. This is -4.673 in log form, and the antilog is 0.009. This means 
that when remittances are 0.9 percent of GNI, their estimated effect on development 
is zero, as pictured in Figure 4.14. The area inside the white vertical lines represents 
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those country-years, 64 percent of the observations, in which remittances fall in the 
not significant category. To the left, 32 percent of the observations fall in the 
positive and significant category. Those are countries with remittances less than 0.2 
percent of income like Cameroon and Ghana in the 1990s or Gabon throughout the 
1990s and 2000s. Here the scale is log but I have used the actual values on the 
labels, which explains the skew going to the right. The area to the right of the 
(rightmost) white vertical line, 28 percent of the observations, falls in the negative 
and significant category. These are country-years with remittances more than 2.5 
percent of income such as Benin, Cape Verde, Egypt, and Uganda throughout the 
study period. Overall, the coefficient ranges from positive 0.155 to negative 0.06.  
For illustration, Table 4.C contains a summary of the changes in the ratio of 
remittances to income for the two significant groups of country-years, and Figure 
4.10 shows the distribution in quartiles of the dependent variable. The average 
change for the lower, positive coefficient group (those countries with remittance to 
income ratios less than 0.002) was 162 percent, meaning that the ratio of 
remittances to income grew by more than 100 percent on average for this group. 
TABLE 4.C CHANGES IN AVERAGE REMITTANCE (TO INCOME) FOR GROUPS  
Group  Min.  1st quartile  Median  3rd quartile  Max.  
Remit/GNI < 0.002  -53%  -27%  162%  518%  13760%  
Remit/GNI > 0.025  -60%  -21%  -4%  29%  369%  
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FIGURE 4.15 DISTRIBUTION OF RELATIVE DEVELOPMENT MEASURE 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
A country with 0.0002 ratio of remittance to income (i.e., Côte d’Ivoire or 
Madagascar in the 2000s) has a coefficient of 0.07. At this level, the median increase 
in the ratio of remittance to income of 100 percent would predict a seven percent 
increase in development performance, and could move a country from the second to 
the top quartile of development growth all else equal (represented by the arrow 
marked “A” in Figure 4.15). 
 For countries on the bottom of Table 4.C, those that had remittance to 
income ratios greater than 0.025, the average change in the remittance to income 
ratio was negative four percent, a net decrease. But consider those countries like 
A 
B 
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Cape Verde, Egypt, and Liberia who all had periods with average remittance to 
income ratios around 0.15 (or remittances at 15 percent of income). The coefficient 
for countries with a remittance to income ratio of 0.15 is -0.06. All else equal, if a 
country with this amount of remittance (0.15 ratio to income) were to increase its 
ratio to 0.19 (representing a 29 percent increase, or the 75th percentile of the 
observed data, see Table 4.C), the result would be a 1.6 percent decrease in 
development growth and could move a country from the second to the bottom 
quartile of development (represented by the arrow marked “B” in Figure 4.15). 
While a 1.6 percent decrease may seem minimal it is still a statistically significant 
change in a country’s in development prospects. Small amounts of remittance with 
respect to income are healthy for developing economies; larger amounts (indicating 
more emigration and brain drain) hinder development growth. 
SUMMARY 
In this chapter, I tested two hypotheses concerning these expatriates 
investigating the impacts of remittances and institutionalized diaspora engagement 
on development. The results from the quantitative analysis confirm one of the two 
hypotheses. Smaller amounts of remittances – less than 0.2 percent of income – are 
associated with positive development growth while larger amounts – greater than 
2.5 percent of income – are negatively so. The hypothesis concerning the positive 
relationship between having a national governmental organization of the diaspora 
and development growth is not accepted, as the estimated coefficient for that 
variable is not significantly different from zero. Ancillary findings of interest include 
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those for democracy and foreign aid. Both are positively and significantly related to 
development growth: the model predicts that African democracies in the sample 
would grow five percent more during the five year periods than nondemocracies, all 
else equal; the predicted increases in development growth as a result of increasing 
aid (with respect to income) are slight but support the view that well-placed aid can 
support development. Unsurprisingly, violent conflict and HIV prevalence are both 
negatively and statistically significantly related to development growth.  
 The main findings raise as many questions as they answer. Questions 
answered include whether transnational remittances are associated with 
development gains or losses. The answer is both. Relatively small amounts of 
remittance with respect to income can be healthy for development, though many 
countries – 28 percent of the observations, countries like Benin, Cape Verde, Egypt, 
and Uganda – received more than 2.5 percent of income in remittances. The results 
suggest that, ceteris paribus, in these countries would have achieved more 
development growth had remittances been a smaller portion of income. Questions 
raised by these results include those of policy alternatives and best practices for 
developing governments in Africa in dealing with migration, diasporas, and 
remittances. Which policy options exist for mitigating the negative impacts of 
emigration and brain-drain in countries that suffer from disproportionate losses in 
human capital? How can developing country governments help to leverage 
remittances for development?  
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 Moreover, how can governments harness the potential of their diasporas for 
development at home? Can the new national level governmental diaspora ministries 
and offices create effective and enduring transnational public-private linkages? How 
can they meet the challenges they face: inconsistencies across regime changes and 
the lack of capacity, coordination, and data? These questions and others are 
addressed in the following chapter.   
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NOTES: CHAPTER FOUR 
 
1 The 34 LDCs in Africa are: Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Comoros, Democratic Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, São 
Tomé and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and 
Zambia.  
2 The conversion of actual GNP into purchasing power parities allows direct comparisons across 
countries and time periods. The choice to use GNP over GDP is a conscious one. While GDP 
represents the volume of production within a state including foreign companies, GNP represents all 
income produced by a state’s nationals and their businesses, regardless of their location. The 
deepening of economic globalization and increasing migration support using gross national products 
rather than gross domestic ones as a more accurate measure of economic productivity. Purchasing 
power parity data for Africa are most complete in the Penn World Tables, more so than that of the 
World Bank or International Monetary Fund, hence the choice to use these data. 
3 The BRICS countries are: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. 
4 Countries in each regional classification are shown in the appendix, Table A4.A. 
5 South Sudan gained sovereignty in 2011 and is therefore not included here.  
6 The two measures, GNI and GNP are theoretically equivalent, though GNI measures income received 
(wages and dividends) and GNP measures income produced (sales) (Hirschman 2012). In general, 
the differences are slight, and the two, for which data are available, are highly correlated for the 
country-years I use here. 
7 Also following the IMF and common practice when working with income and other monetary 
variables, I employ the natural logarithm of the ratio of remittances to income. This helps achieve a 
“more” linear relationship between predictors and results and curbs the influence of outlying values. 
8 Statistically, the actual formal null hypothesis for the Hausman test states that there is no difference 
between two models: a random effects model and a fixed effects model. When no statistically 
significant difference is found, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, and the random effects 
estimator is more efficient and parsimonious, and thus analysts should choose random over fixed 
effects. However, analysts should also make theoretically conscious choices between random and 
fixed effects models. For example, in the present model the Hausman test shows the presence of 
statistically significant country effects, though most if not all comparative scholars would argue that 
any group of 43 developing countries face diverse challenges for development and also confront 
these challenges through  myriad strategies. In the absence of 1) perfect or near-perfect information 
and 2) the ability to operationalize this information into quantitatively measurable data, analysts 
should generally  use fixed effects (Clark and Linzer 2012; Wooldridge 2002).   
9 This condition can be addressed with a heteroskedasticity-robust variance covariance matrix for 
the coefficients. 
10 Cross-sectional dependence, like heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, can be addressed by 
calculating a variance covariance matrix for the coefficients robust to the specific diagnostic 
challenge. In general, calculating robust variance covariance matrices results in larger standard 
errors for coefficients, making statistical significance more difficult to achieve.  
11 To explain, the coefficient for HIV prevalence is -0.015. This represents a 1.5 percent decrease in 
development (deviation from fit) expected for a one percent increase in HIV prevalence (after the 
conversion for the log-level relationship). Thus the observed increase of 71 percent in HIV 
prevalence for the Basotho from 1995 to 2000 is associated with a 106.5 percent decrease in 
development gains. This indicates that, all else equal, Lesotho’s development gains could have been 
over 100 percent of those observed, thereby doubling any observed progress. In this particular case, 
Lesotho had a development deviation from fit of -0.17, meaning that it experienced a shortfall 
relative to its 1995 development index value, which was 0.47 and approximately equal to the mean 
value for that time period (see Figure A4.1 in Chapter Four Appendix). Increasing the observed 
shortfall by 106.5 percent results in 0.181) and would yield a net excess for Lesotho in 2000 of 0.01.  
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12 Recall that countries receiving “free” ratings scored relatively high on two indexes: one for political 
rights and one for civil liberties. Index values are calculated with responses to expert surveys from 
each country and contain sub-scores including those for freedom in executive and legislative 
electoral processes, political pluralism and participation, government functioning, associational 
rights, freedom of expression, religion, and academe (Freedom House 2011). 
13 Increasing Ghana’s 2000 aid to income percentage from eight to the average of ten percent of 
income is an increase of 25 percent (0.10 – 0.8 = 0.2; 0.2/0.8 = 0.25) this increase would predict a 
1.25 percent increase in relative development all else equal. 
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APPENDIX: CHAPTER FOUR 
TABLE A4.A REGIONAL CLASSIFICATIONS 
Central Eastern Northern Southern Western 
Angola Burundi Algeria Botswana Benin 
Cameroon Comoros Egypt Lesotho Burkina Faso 
Central African 
Republic 
Djibouti Libya Namibia Cape Verde 
Chad Eritrea Morocco South Africa  Côte d’Ivoire 
Congo Ethiopia Tunisia Swaziland Gambia 
Democratic Congo Kenya   Ghana 
Equatorial Guinea Madagascar   Guinea 
Gabon Malawi   Guinea-Bissau 
Sao Tome & Principe   Mauritius   Liberia 
 Mozambique   Mali 
 Rwanda   Mauritania 
 Seychelles   Niger 
 Somalia   Nigeria 
 Sudan   Senegal 
 Tanzania   Sierra Leone 
 Uganda   Togo 
 Zambia    
 Zimbabwe    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Development from Abroad? 
 
127 
Chapter 4: Appendix 
TABLE A4.B INCOME BY 2010 RANK 
 
 
GNPppp pc Average Annual Growth 
Rank Country 1980 2010 1980s 1990s 2000s 
1 Seychelles $6,265 $32,322 8% 5% 5% 
2 Libya $9,641* $20,227 -4% 2% 9% 
3 Gabon $7,130 $13,005 1% 0% 8% 
4 Mauritius $1,482 $10,515 11% 6% 4% 
5 Botswana $1,484 $10,285 13% 5% 4% 
6 South Africa $3,016 $8,730 2% 3% 6% 
7 Equatorial Guinea $376 $7,165 -2% 32% 17% 
8 Tunisia $1,825 $7,147 4% 4% 6% 
9 Algeria $2,694 $6,933 2% 2% 6% 
10 Namibia $1,984 $5,831 4% 2% 6% 
11 Angola $831 $5,314 4% 5% 16% 
12 Egypt $779 $5,161 9% 6% 5% 
13 Swaziland $1,397 $4,047 8% 1% 4% 
14 Morocco $989 $4,032 6% 3% 7% 
15 Cape Verde $474 $3,945 9% 6% 7% 
16 Djibouti $1,500 $2,996 2% 1% 6% 
17 Mauritania $647 $2,558 4% 3% 8% 
18 Sudan $591 $2,328 3% 3% 8% 
19 Ghana $760 $2,251 2% 4% 6% 
20 Lesotho $604 $2,084 6% 2% 6% 
21 Cameroon $803 $2,035 5% 1% 4% 
22 Zambia $556 $2,002 2% 4% 10% 
23 Congo $788 $1,975 4% 5% 6% 
24 Sao Tome & Principe $923 $1,842 1% 1% 6% 
25 Senegal $578 $1,640 5% 2% 4% 
26 Chad $255 $1,626 8% 1% 13% 
27 Nigeria $790 $1,474 -1% 4% 6% 
28 Kenya $529 $1,461 4% 3% 4% 
29 Cote d`Ivoire $707 $1,386 1% 2% 4% 
30 Gambia $551 $1,376 5% 2% 3% 
31 Tanzania $332 $1,313 4% 2% 8% 
32 Benin $463 $1,294 5% 3% 3% 
33 Uganda $265 $1,268 5% 6% 6% 
34 Rwanda $558 $1,216 4% -1% 8% 
35 Burkina Faso $351 $1,149 4% 3% 6% 
36 Mali $288 $1,100 6% 3% 5% 
37 Sierra Leone $496 $1,033 3% -3% 9% 
38 Comoros $657 $973 3% -1% 2% 
39 Guinea-Bissau $450 $905 5% -1% 4% 
40 Guinea $349 $891 4% 3% 3% 
41 Togo $553 $860 2% 0% 3% 
42 Mozambique $235 $855 1% 4% 9% 
43 Ethiopia $244 $810 3% 2% 8% 
44 Madagascar $534 $807 1% 1% 2% 
45 Malawi $369 $791 1% 1% 7% 
46 Eritrea $602* $699 n/a 3% 0% 
47 Central African Republic $329 $674 4% 2% 3% 
48 Niger $428 $549 0% 0% 2% 
49 Somalia $311 $487 4% -2% 3% 
50 Burundi $253 $452 5% -2% 3% 
51 Liberia $656 $404 -6% 10% 0% 
52 Zimbabwe $195 $359 5% -1% 3% 
53 Democratic Congo $302 $263 0% -5% 5% 
*First column data for Libya and Eritrea are from 1985 and 1992 respectively 
Source: Heston, Summers, and Aten 2012 (Penn World Tables) 
 
 
Appendix 
128 
Combs 
TABLE A4.C EXTREME VALUES FOR DEVELOPMENT INDEX 
Indicator Minimum Maximum 
Expected Years of Schooling for Children (years) 0 18 
(Australia 2010) 
Life Expectancy at Birth (years) 20 83.2 
(Japan 2010) 
Income (GNP PPP per capita) $100 $141,204 
(Qatar 2010) 
 
Sources: UNDP 2011; Heston, Summers, and Aten 2012 
 
FIGURE A4.1 DEVELOPMENT INDEX, 1980 – 2010  
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TABLE A4.D COUNTRY-YEARS INCLUDED IN MODEL 
       
 
= INCLUDED 
  
= NOT INCLUDED 
  
       
 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
 ALGERIA
     
ALGERIA 
ANGOLA 
     
ANGOLA 
BENIN 
     
BENIN 
BOTSWANA 
     
BOTSWANA 
BURKINA FASO 
     
BURKINA FASO 
BURUNDI 
     
BURUNDI 
CAMEROON 
     
CAMEROON 
CAPE VERDE 
     
CAPE VERDE 
C.A.R. 
     
C.A.R. 
CHAD 
     
CHAD 
COMOROS 
     
COMOROS 
CONGO 
     
CONGO 
CÔTE D’IVOIRE 
     
CÔTE D’IVOIRE 
D.R.C. 
     
D.R.C. 
DJIBOUTI 
     
DJIBOUTI 
EGYPT 
     
EGYPT 
EQ. GUINEA 
     
EQ. GUINEA 
ERITREA 
     
ERITREA 
ETHIOPIA 
     
ETHIOPIA 
GABON 
     
GABON 
GAMBIA 
     
GAMBIA 
GHANA 
     
GHANA 
GUINEA 
     
GUINEA 
GUINEA-BISSAU 
     
GUINEA-BISSAU 
KENYA 
     
KENYA 
LESOTHO 
     
LESOTHO 
LIBERIA 
     
LIBERIA 
LIBYA 
     
LIBYA 
MADAGASCAR 
     
MADAGASCAR 
MALAWI 
     
MALAWI 
MALI 
     
MALI 
MAURITANIA 
     
MAURITANIA 
MAURITIUS 
     
MAURITIUS 
MOROCCO 
     
MOROCCO 
MOZAMBIQUE 
     
MOZAMBIQUE 
NAMIBIA 
     
NAMIBIA 
NIGER 
     
NIGER 
NIGERIA 
     
NIGERIA 
RWANDA 
     
RWANDA 
SAO T & P 
     
SAO T & P 
SENEGAL 
     
SENEGAL 
SEYCHELLES 
     
SEYCHELLES 
SIERRA LEONE 
     
SIERRA LEONE 
SOMALIA 
     
SOMALIA 
SOUTH AFRICA 
     
SOUTH AFRICA 
SUDAN 
     
SUDAN 
SWAZILAND 
     
SWAZILAND 
TANZANIA 
     
TANZANIA 
TOGO 
     
TOGO 
TUNISIA 
     
TUNISIA 
UGANDA 
     
UGANDA 
ZAMBIA 
     
ZAMBIA 
ZIMBABWE 
     
ZIMBABWE 
 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
 
       
 
= INCLUDED 
  
= NOT INCLUDED 
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TABLE A4.E RESULTS FROM INSTRUMENTING AND DEVIATION-FROM-FIT MODELS 
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TABLE A4.F MODEL COMPARISONS (INSTRUMENTS) 
(Dependent Variable = development, deviation-from-
fit) Model I II 
 
  
Remit … 0.012 
 
… (0.014) 
Remit2 … 0.000 
 
… (0.001) 
Remit(fitted) -0.096* … 
 
(0.026) … 
Remit(fitted)2 -0.010* … 
 
(0.003) … 
Aid  … 0.032* 
 
… (0.009) 
Aid(fitted) 0.054* … 
 
(0.010) … 
Gov’t Diaspora Inst. -0.001 -0.007 
 
(0.013) (0.012) 
HIV prevalence -0.015* -0.013* 
 
(0.005) (0.004) 
War/Violence -0.086* -0.072* 
 
(0.036) (0.036) 
∆ Trade Openness 0.021 0.015 
 
(0.017) (0.017) 
Political constraints 0.065 0.030 
 
(0.042) (0.038) 
FH: Partially Free 0.004 -0.004 
 
(0.009) (0.010) 
FH: Free 0.049* 0.035 
 
(0.021) (0.023) 
 
  
Adj. R-sq. 0.170 0.146 
F(9, 110) 3.681* 3.012* 
p < F 0.000 0.002 
N            162 (i=43, t= 2-5) 
Time-fixed effects significant in both models (not shown). 
*p < 0.05. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DEVELOPMENT FROM ABROAD? 
Remittances from diasporic African communities present opportunities and 
challenges for economic, social, and political development. At the start of the 
twenty-first century, members of the diaspora remit around $50 billion to Africa 
annually – more than one-third of the continent’s transnational capital receipts. 
Despite increasing remittance flows and the emergence of governmental diaspora 
agencies development goals remain largely unattained: 34 of Africa’s 54 states 
continue to be designated by the UN as least developed countries. Nevertheless 
there are variations between regions and countries. North African countries have 
been able to capitalize on their hydrocarbon resources, proximity to Southern 
Europe, and historical geopolitical importance to increase the pace of development. 
The small island nations of the Seychelles and Mauritius have exploited their 
comparative advantages in tourism and financial services. Namibia and South Africa, 
which ended long costly conflicts in the 1990s, have embarked on stabilizing their 
political institutions and diversifying economic infrastructures. In the west, the 
petro-state of Ghana is re-engaging its domestic and diasporic constituents for 
national development and greater improvement in living conditions for its people.  
This dissertation’s comparative analysis of remittance inflows and national 
development growth in 43 African countries revealed ambiguous and complex 
relationships. Remittances are, at times, negatively related to development and, at 
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other times, positively so. Put differently, remittances are neither requisites nor 
absolute deterrents of development. As discussed throughout this dissertation and 
largely due to the significant increase of monetary remittances, 36 governments 
have institutionalized efforts to engage diasporas through creating formal national 
diaspora ministries and/or offices. 1 In addition to sending money home, members 
of the diaspora provide skills, expertise, and many other services for national 
development efforts. Diaspora institutions meet with diaspora groups at home and 
abroad, disseminate economic and policy information, maintain diaspora skills 
databases, and offer investment incentives for development projects. Below is a 
summary of findings followed by a brief discussion of these findings for a deeper 
understanding of the short-term and long-term significance of the role of 
remittances and diaspora communities in the economic, social, and political 
development of twenty-first century African countries.  
SUMMARY 
 This research focused on testing two hypotheses. The first hypothesis held 
that for African states, small amounts of remittances in relation to income would be 
positively associated with development and that larger amounts would be 
negatively so. The second hypothesis argued that states with a national diaspora 
ministry or office would experience more development growth than those without 
such an institution.  
 In contrast to conventional assumptions that African economies are 
dependent on foreign aid, the analysis in Chapter One showed not only did 
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continental remittance receipts exceed aid in 2007, but that they also surpassed 
foreign investment in 2010.  Transnational capital inflows to Africa, when compared 
to other developing regions, are unique in that remittances surpass both foreign aid 
and investment only to Africa. By 2010, African countries received an average of $80 
million remitted through formal transaction agencies annually. Significantly, these 
findings demonstrate that diasporic Africans send more money to the continent 
than international financial institutions or multinational corporations.   
Chapter Two reexamined theoretical discourse and debates that until the 
1990s oscillated between periods of prevailing optimism or pessimism regarding 
migration and remittances in promoting development.2 It highlighted the more 
recent emergence of an increasingly complex dialogue that significantly shifted 
focus from individuals to households and enduring transnational linkages.3 This 
shift allowed the discourse to move beyond debates of remittances and migration as 
either helpful or harmful for development. With growing levels of global and 
regional remittances, empirical studies of remittance impacts have become more 
common. The chapter found that while most studies at the household level of 
analysis concluded that remittances were helpful for receiving families, studies of 
national level impacts more commonly found remittances inhibitive for 
development. However, the majority of remittance and development studies 
operationalized national development narrowly as economic growth, and ignored 
impacts of remittances on social development, for example education and 
healthcare. In light of empirical evidence that 80 percent of remittances from the 
diaspora are spent on food, shelter, health, and education,4 the emergent school-of-
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thought that concluded remittances were detrimental for national development 
demanded a closer scrutiny. In addition, the review addressed the challenges for 
new governmental diaspora institutions and found that regime changes and 
inadequate data, intergovernmental coordination, and lack of resources plague 
many of the agencies.  
Chapter Three analyzed the political economy of remittance in Africa. Data 
revealed that many of the 30 million Africans who emigrated from their countries 
remained on the continent, and two of the top five destination countries were Côte 
d’Ivoire and South Africa.5 It presented a discussion of the challenges of “brain-
drain”, the formal and informal mechanisms available to remitters, and the 
structural limitations in receiving countries. The chapter identified top remittance 
receivers like Gambia and Cape Verde, with an estimated 10 percent of income in 
remittances accompanied by the loss over 60 percent of their tertiary-educated 
populations to outmigration.6  In addition, the chapter explored underlying social 
and market conditions that influenced choices between formal and informal 
remittance channels. It identified three major institutional challenges: the world’s 
fewest banks and ATMs per person, a duopolistic remittance service provider 
market with the world’s highest fees, and restrictive international and national 
policy environments that inhibit change.7 The chapter also provided context for the 
emergence of national level government diaspora institutions – the first in 1988, 
Office of Tunisians Abroad to the latest, Equatorial Guinea’s Directorate of Diaspora 
Affairs established in 2013. It reviewed their structures, missions, and strategies as 
well as their focus on building organizational capacity.  
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Chapter Four quantitatively analyzed the impacts of remittances and 
governmental diaspora agencies on African nations’ development using data from 
43 states from 1990 to 2010. It operationalized development as an index of three 
indicators: education, health, and income. Testing the hypotheses through 
longitudinal regression analysis exposed a more complex and nuanced relationship 
between remittance and development than previous studies. The findings of this 
dissertation indicate that while small amounts of remittances – up to 0.2 percent of 
income – can help development, larger quantities do the opposite. Controlling for 
development level in 1990 and other relevant social, economic, and political 
conditions,8 nation-states like Botswana and Tanzania that receive around 0.2 
percent of income in remittances make larger development strides than either 
Gambia or Togo where remittances are around 10 percent of income. While the 
analysis in Chapter Four found that the development differences between countries 
with and without governmental diaspora ministries/offices were not statistically 
significant, it significantly showed that all else being equal, democratic African 
countries (as rated by Freedom House) like Ghana and Mauritius made larger 
advances toward development than nondemocracies. The findings of this chapter 
point to even more complex linkages of economic and political development factors 
with not only the receiving of remittances but the institutional mechanisms that 
promote or inhibit flows of funds by national political and financial institutions.  
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DISCUSSION 
 Now more than ever, Africans in the diaspora possess the potential to shape 
Africa’s development. This dissertation investigated the broad question of whether 
“development from abroad” is possible for African states through remittances and 
institutionalized diaspora engagement. The answer is yes and no. The impacts of 
almost $50 billion in remittances received annually are diverse and of course 
depend on the contexts in which they are exchanged. Beyond sending money to 
friends and family, members of the diaspora offer skills, services, and technical 
expertise to their countries of origin that contribute to development. 
Institutionalizing government relations with these potential agents of development 
may seem like an obvious step in the right direction.   
 Increasingly, diasporic communities and their contributions occupy a more 
central place in national development strategies, yet the short-term and long-term 
impacts of their remittances remain constrained by structural deficiencies and lack 
of institutional mechanisms to translate the transacted funds into concrete 
development factors. The dissertation found no statistically significant difference 
between the development patterns of states with and without governmental 
diaspora institutions. Many possible factors exist to explain this finding. First, 
governments like South Africa successfully engage diasporic communities through 
numerous extant agencies. For some states, the creation of an institution dedicated 
to the diaspora would be redundant. Second, national diaspora ministries and 
offices are young, especially in bureaucratic terms: in 2010 their average age was 
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less than six years. Many struggle to build capacity in environments characterized 
by few resources and poor intergovernmental coordination. Third, agencies are 
varied both in structure and bureaucratic position, and these variations create 
different opportunities and unique challenges. Fourth, diasporas are diverse. Each 
government has a unique history of relations with its diaspora, and each diaspora 
includes a unique combination of supporters and opponents of current 
administrations as well as different and diverse skills, expertise, and resources.  
 All of the characteristics above render generalizing about the institutions (as 
quantitative analysis attempts) more difficult. Yet, this study points to common 
development objectives of governmental diaspora institutions. Two major goals 
emerge:  (1) to leverage expatriate remittances, skills, and transnational linkages for 
development, and (2) to diminish the deleterious effects of outmigration such as 
brain-drain and potential dependence on remittances. Identifying these shared 
objectives for diaspora agencies in Africa provides new indicators for future studies 
with which to measure the capacities of governmental diaspora institutions. 
 African diasporas continue to grow accompanied by various types of 
governmental diaspora institutions seeking to formulate new strategies to re-invest 
finances and utilize skills in creative ways. My brief fieldwork in Ethiopia revealed 
that its Diaspora Directorate has been successful in offering foreign currency 
accounts with attractive interest rates and selling diaspora bonds, and in receiving 
investments for development projects from Ethiopian nationals abroad.  These 
strategies have been influenced by similar and successful programs in India.9 
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 However, the current trend in Africa to create national-level agencies tasked 
with engaging the diaspora for development is at its early stages. Though diaspora 
agencies may become effective in facilitating development in the future, the findings 
suggest that African nations’ development objectives may be better spent on 
creating jobs and political spaces for civil society engagement that may inhibit 
outward migration. Development strategies predicated on high levels of emigration 
are not sustainable options. Inadequate social and economic institutions (i.e., poor 
school systems, undiversified economic sectors, and a lack of public safety nets), and 
political instability constrict development and fuel increased diaspora formation. 
Nevertheless, there exists potential for development if governments are able to 
formulate proactive policies such as expansion of affordable educational 
institutions, broadening of employment choices, and increasing transparency, along 
with the engagement of diasporic communities.  
 Paradoxically, diasporic earning powers are based on a perpetuation of 
cycles that drain African countries of their skilled citizens and youth. From a 
political development perspective, the increasing involvement of the diaspora in the 
social and economic sphere can serve as a disincentive for governments to the most 
basic of responsibilities of governance such as protection and provision of basic 
social services. Diasporic communities’ contributions in building schools and 
medical centers and providing funds for doctors, nurses, and dentists in rural areas 
should not prevent governments from building necessary institutions and 
infrastructure in these sectors. Evasion of traditionally public responsibilities could 
increasingly become an option for governments in countries where diasporas 
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provide more and more social services. A more judicious coordination of diaspora 
contributions with long-term national development projects could lead to a solution 
for both African governments and their citizens at home and abroad. 
 Indeed, looking toward 2015 and the “euphoria” surrounding the 
development potential of diasporas along with rising remittances and diaspora 
involvement since 2000, one may be forgiven for assuming that after a decade-and-
a-half development outcomes would be stellar. 10  However, growth in median 
national remittance receipts from $10 million to $80 million since 2000 has not 
brought many African countries much closer to meeting development goals.  In fact, 
the dissertation findings showed that African countries with relatively small 
remittance receipts demonstrated larger development gains than those who 
received larger remittances (more than 2.5 percent of income). Growing 
dependence upon remittances prolonged by cycles of outmigration, brain-drain, lack 
of affordable education, and sluggish economic growth, does not bode well for 
African development. Empirical findings indicating that countries receiving high 
levels of remittance develop more slowly than others may only provide partial 
answers to questions concerning the complex relationship of remittances and 
national development.  
 This dissertation’s findings highlight a little-noted fact of critical importance 
to African development: diasporic Africans remit more funds than are invested by 
MNCs or loaned by international financial institutions. Attention to the role of 
diasporic communities therefore is timely and worthy of deeper examination. 
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Viewed in comparative terms, it calls our attention to similarities and differences 
between Africa’s diasporic communities and those of Asia. Furthermore, the 
acknowledgement of African diasporic communities by national governments points 
to new arenas of policymaking that intertwine challenges of globalization, 
democratization, and socioeconomic development. The pursuit of this complex set 
of policymaking goals also indicates the potential for innovative ways of rebuilding 
state-society relations.  
 This dissertation also raises a major question about the role of African 
governments: what types of governmental policies are needed when remittances 
constitute the sole safety net for citizens? These de facto forms of social insurance 
may help to keep citizens complacent but are not without costs. Accessible and 
equitable financial services are necessary in the age of globalization. Neoliberal 
thinking might argue that government should stay out of the remittance business. 
However, creating policies to help reduce barriers-to-entry into remittance markets 
for MTOs besides Western Union and MoneyGram and to increase access in newer 
more competitive markets could transform the impacts of remittances. 
Furthermore, indirectly managing migration through policymaking and capacity-
building in social institutions could see more citizens thrive and be more likely to 
become agents of development at home.   
LOOKING FORWARD 
 African democracies and nondemocracies have created governmental 
diaspora agencies. With few exceptions, the institutions are new and more research 
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is needed to identify their challenges, successes, and failures. Specifically, studies of 
diaspora members and groups both inside and outside of Africa who are working or 
have worked directly with the new governmental institutions could provide 
empirical data on diasporic contributions in the first decade-and-a-half of the 
twenty-first century. Furthermore, case studies of various African diasporic 
communities and the mechanisms and institutions that transact remittances would 
shed light on institutional barriers to productive engagement of diasporas in 
development. Combining case-study approaches with empirically-based research 
could serve to compile useful guides for best practices for national development 
projects beyond 2015.   
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NOTES: CHAPTER FIVE 
 
1 For details about diaspora ministries and offices, see Table A3.H, page 86. 
2 See especially de Haas 2010 and Gamlen 2010.  
3 See Glick Schiller 2003, 2009 and Massey et al 1993. 
4 See pages 11-12 and Bardouille 2008.  
5 See Figure 3.1 and pages 55-57.  
6 See Table 3.A and pages 69-71. 
7 See pages 58-66.  
8 The control variables included the Political Constraints Index, Freedom House ratings, foreign aid, 
trade growth, violent conflict, HIV prevalence. For descriptions see pages 99-113.  
9 Fieldwork in Addis Ababa in July 2013. Specific investment opportunities for Ethiopian nationals at 
the time mostly pertained to the construction of the Grand Renaissance Dam. India has sold over $10 
billion in diaspora bonds which has been re-invested into national development projects. For more 
information, see pages 73-75 and Aguinas 2009.  
10 See Mitchell 2006.  
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